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I NFORMAL Marriage. To prove an informal marriage the parties must
f not only demonstrate an agreement to be married and subsequent cohab-
itation as husband and wife, but also a holding out to others that they
are husband and wife. 1 The evidence necessary to satisfy the third element
was considered in Persons v. Persons.2 The surviving wife asserted that she
and her divorced husband had contracted an informal remarriage by which
she was entitled to the intestate husband's property to the exclusion of his
next of kin. Two weeks prior to his death the man had prepared a credit
application to purchase a vehicle in which application he had referred to the
woman as his spouse. The appeals court held that this was a sufficient hold-
ing out to the public and, therefore, satisfied the representation element for
proof of the informal marriage.
3
The Beaumont court of appeals addressed a similar situation in Daniel v.
Daniel.4 A jury found that the couple had not formed an informal marriage
subsequent to their divorce, and the wife appealed on grounds of improper
submission of a special issue.5 The appellate court sustained the wife's asser-
tion.6 The wife had objected to the use of the words "new marriage" within
the jury charge, arguing that inclusion of that term imposed a greater burden
of proof than the statute defining informal marriage required. 7 The court in
effect held that the elements of an informal marriage as defined by the Fam-
B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Frederic Liskow and Camille McLeod
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1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975).
2. 666 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3. Id. at 563. The latter two elements of the Texas test for an informal marriage have
been neatly dovetailed in a different context in recent Louisiana legislation terminating ali-
mony when the former spouse has taken up post-divorce relations with another in open concu-
binage. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1984). Under an appellate court's
interpretation, "openness" (the analogue to the Texas holding-out standard) takes on a decid-
edly moralistic character; i.e., it is "the absence of any pretense or disguise which would pro-
vide a morally acceptable cloak for their relationship." Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So. 2d 879,
882 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
4. 676 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. Id. at 669.
6. Id. at 670.
7. Id. at 669. The wife properly preserved error by submitting her own correctly worded
special issue, which the judge refused. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
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ily Code do not support a requirement that the wife show public awareness
that the couple had entered into a new marriage. 8
As in Daniel, the appellant in Zephyr v. Zephyr9 filed for divorce on the
assumption that an informal marriage existed. The trial court found that no
informal marriage existed and awarded the disputed property to the appel-
lee. On appeal the appellant asserted that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to award the property to the appellee in the absence of a decree of divorce.
The appellate court held, however, that the trial court had jurisdiction to
grant a division of property because the appellee's cross action had sought an
adjudication that the parties were never married and prayed a settlement of
their property rights.10 The appellate court nevertheless reversed the award
of the property to the appellee. 1I The parties were cograntees of the prop-
erty. When that occurs, a presumption arises that each of the grantees is
vested with title to an equal undivided interest. 12 The court held the appel-
lee had not rebutted this presumption.1 3
In Roach v. Roach14 the husband sought to establish the existence of an
informal marriage before the couple's ceremonial marriage. The trial court
held he had not sustained his burden of proof. Holding that the jury was in
the best position to reconcile the conflict in testimony, the appellate court
affirmed. 15
Abatement. In McKenzie v. McKenzie16 the wife brought suit for divorce,
but the husband asserted that there was no marriage to dissolve. The wife's
preliminary issue of an informal marriage was submitted to a jury, which
found that a marriage existed. Before a subsequently scheduled hearing on
divorce and property issues, the husband died, and the court dismissed the
action. Seeking to avoid relitigation of the marriage issue in her probate
proceedings, the widow appealed. The Dallas appeals court affirmed, hold-
ing that without the possibility of a divorce, the severed issue of the existence
of the informal marriage did not meet the controversy requirement and,
8. 676 S.W.2d at 669-70.
9. 679 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
10. Id. at 555. The appellant also claimed that the trial court erred in finding that no
informal marriage existed. Because the husband denied two of the elements of an informal
marriage, the court held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's holding. Id. at 556.
11. Id. at 556-57.
12. Wooley v. West, 391 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(presumption that cotenants had equal interest was rebutted).
13. 679 S.W.2d at 556-57. Both appellant and appellee were liable on the loan and deed of
trust that secured funds for purchase of the home. The appellee had also argued that he was
entitled to complete ownership of the house under the doctrine of inception of title. The court
held this doctrine applied only to married couples. 679 S.W.2d at 556.
14. 672 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ); see infra notes 69-70 and ac-
companying text for discussion of the characterization issue in Roach.
15. 672 S.W.2d at 529. Evidence as to the parties' intentions conflicted. The husband
presented the parties' joint income tax returns and a letter to an administrative agency as
evidence that the couple had held themselves out to others as husband and wife. The wife
stated that, in telling the agency that she was married, she lied and had used the husband's
name because she was embarrassed by their merely living together.
16. 667 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
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hence, was not justiciable. 17 To be justiciable the issue of an informal mar-
riage must have constituted a separate cause of action. 18 The court correctly
held that the husband's death mooted the dispute for dissolution of the mar-
riage and rendered the issue of the existence of the marriage meaningless.19
The court distinguished this case from prior Texas decisions holding that a
suit for divorce does not become moot when a party dies if the adjudication
of divorce or the event of death would affect property rights differently. 20 In
those cases the property had already been divided and judgment of divorce
had been pronounced. In McKenzie those issues had not even been argued.
Hence, although the issue of informal marriage was not moot for other pur-
poses, the court properly dismissed the case because the issue had become
moot in the context in which it arose. 21
Novotny v. Novotny 22 presented the question whether the death of one
party to a divorce proceeding abates the suit; the death occurred during the
period after the adoption of a master's report, but prior to entry of a formal
decree. Three weeks after the trial judge adopted a master's report in an
agreed divorce, the wife shot and killed the husband. Some months later she
filed a motion to dismiss the suit for divorce. 23 The judge denied the motion
and was affirmed by the appellate court. The memorandum adopting the
master's report was equivalent to entry of final judgment in an agreed case. 24
The court further stated that if neither party objects to the master's findings
in such an instance, the report is conclusive on the issues. 25 Although the
trial judge had not signed the judgment prior to the husband's death, it be-
came final once the court adopted the master's report. 26 The wife also ar-
17. Id. at 570.
18. Id.; accord TEX. R. CIv. P. 41; accord Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162
Tex. 599, 611-12, 350 S.W.2d 11, 19(1961); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. McPeak, 641 S.W.2d 284, 289
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. 667 S.W.2d at 572; see also Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dispute over jurisdiction and venue mooted by wife's
death). The wife also contended on appeal that the trial court erred in not entering a judgment
on the jury's verdict under TEX. R. Civ. P. 156. The court held that rule 156 does not apply to
the situation when the answers to a special issue do not grant relief upon which the court could
render a judgment. 667 S.W.2d at 571.
20. Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. 1969); Vernet v. Vernet, 570 S.W.2d 138,
140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ).
21. 667 S.W.2d at 572. In Black v. Black, 673 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984,
no writ), the court of appeals addressed the issue of an appeal's mootness when the appellant
died before the argument. The wife had limited her appeal to the issue of child-custody. The
court held that because no property rights were at stake, the appeal was moot. The wife's
attempt to gain custody died with her since any determination of custody would have no effect.
Id. at 270; see also Greene v. Schuble, 654 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1983) (managing conserva-
tor's death ends conservatorship order); Knollhoff v. Norris, 152 Tex. 231, 234, 256 S.W.2d
79, 81 (1953) (custody automatically vests in father when mother dies).
22. 665 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd).
23. Id. at 173. The wife apparently stood to gain a significantly larger share of her hus-
band's probate estate, as oposed to her share under the divorce decree. Id. at 174.
24. Id. at 173.
25. Id.; accord Cameron v. Cameron, 601 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980,
no writ).
26. 665 S.W.2d at 173. The court held that signing the judgment was not a prerequisite to
finding a rendition of judgment. Id.; accord Texas State Bd. of Examiners v. Cane, 337 S.W.2d
801, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd).
1985]
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gued that the husband's death rendered the controversy moot. The court
held, however, that when property rights are affected differently by a deter-
mination of whether the marriage ended because of death or as a result of
divorce, the case was not moot. 27 The court also rejected the wife's argu-
ment that the parties had not settled the issue of their property rights.28 The
court found that the parties had fully agreed to the master's report and
waived any disagreement with the report when they did not object at the
master's hearing. 29
Interspousal Disputes. The question of whether an employer can claim im-
munity from an action based on the principle of respondeat superior brought
by an employee's spouse was addressed for the first time by a Texas appellate
court in Langley v. National Lead Co. 30 The wife was injured while riding as
a passenger in a truck negligently operated by her husband acting within the
scope of his employment. The employer argued that because the husband
was immune from suit by his wife, the husband's employer should be simi-
larly protected. Following the majority of decisions in other jurisdictions,
the court rejected this argument. 3' The tort is actionable although the hus-
band is exempt from liability.32 The court found no justification for includ-
ing the employer within the purely personal family immunity. 33 The result
in Langley is consistent with the previous decision prohibiting an employer
from insulating himself from suit by pleading an employee's parental
immunity.34
In Belz v. Belz 35 the wife joined a claim for fraudulently secreting commu-
nity funds with her suit for divorce. To sustain the independent cause of
action for fraud the wife relied on the established right of one spouse to sue
the other for an intentional tort3 6 and the line of authority that allows one
spouse to reclaim community assets that have been disposed of by the other
27. 665 S.W.2d at 174; accord Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 36
(1971); see also McKenzie v. McKenzie, 667 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ),
discussed supra at notes 16-21 and accompanying text. If the court has not rendered judgment
before a spouse dies, the case will be dismissed. Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.
1983); Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 665 S.W.2d at 174.
29. Id.; see also Cameron v. Cameron, 601 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ) (appellant had orally objected, but offered no evidence).
30. 666 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
3 1. Id. at 345-46. "The tort is complete by itself by the husband acting in his business as
distinguished from acts which arise from the discharge of normal spousal duties and responsi-
bilities." Id. at 345.
32. Id.; Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E.42 (1928) (opin-
ion of Cardozo, J.).
33. 666 S.W.2d at 345 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116(1964)). Prosser states that this argument confuses spousal immunity from suit with lack of
the servant's responsibility.
34. See Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) (parental immunity of
foreman not extended to employer).
35. 667 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
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spouse with an actual 37 or constructive intent to defraud by squandering 38 or
making inappropriate gifts. 39 Although the trial court had awarded both
actual and exemplary damages for the alleged fraud, the appellate court re-
jected the wife's claim on the part of the community estate as being un-
founded in law.40 The court acknowledged that damages might be awarded
for the wrongful disposition of community property4' and for the infliction
of harm, for which recovery is the separate property of the victim. 42 The
court rejected the claim for fraud in attempting to secrete community assets
that were not dissipated. Once uncovered, such assets are subject to division
by the divorce judge, who may take the husband's conduct into account in
awarding a larger share of the community to the wife along with the attor-
ney's fees necessary to ferret out the assets.43 In York v. York 44 an ex-wife
asserted a similar cause of action against her ex-husband who had success-
fully concealed community assets at the time of their divorce. The value of
the property could be determined and her share partitioned to the ex-wife.
In this instance exemplary damages may be justified; the hiding of assets on
divorce should not go unpunished. In York the trial court awarded exem-
plary damages for concealing the property at divorce. Because the appellate
court affirmed this award, 4 5 it evidently concluded that the ex-wife's attor-
ney's fees constituted the necessary actual damages on which to predicate
her right to exemplary damages.46
In another case4 7 the court discussed the application of the confidential
communication statute to a spouse whose voidable marriage had been an-
nulled. The husband had falsely represented his identity and background to
his wife's relatives and had persuaded them to invest in a nonexistent enter-
prise. In his prosecution for theft and over the objections of the accused, his
former wife testified against him.48 The court held that the wife was compe-
37. Relief sought inter vivos: Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219, 1220 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W. 127, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1918, no writ); relief sought post mortem: Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 567-68,
63 S.W. 624, 624 (1901); Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215-16 (1855) (dictum); Krenz v.
Strohmeir, 177 S.W. 178, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, no writ).
38. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 339-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ)
(squandered assets sought at divorce).
39. Improper donations sought on divorce: Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 54-55
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd); improper donations sought at
death: Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd
n.r.e.); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421, 423
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
40. 667 S.W.2d at 247.
41. Id. at 246-47.
42. Id. at 246.
43. Id. at 247.
44. 678 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e., 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 316
(Mar. 27, 1985).
45. Id. at 113.
46. An award of a money judgment for the ex-wife's share would not seem to constitute
actual damages in this context, because such an award is in lieu of a partitionable interest, Le.,
in its nature a quasi-contractual recovery.
47. Bruni v. State, 669 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
48. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979) disqualifies a spouse from
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tent to testify.49 The court found that the confidential communication stat-
ute, when applied to divorced spouses, only granted the protesting spouse an
opportunity to object to any communications that occurred during the mar-
riage. 50 Since this marriage had been annulled, the marriage never existed
and no confidential marital communication had occurred. 5' The court rea-
soned that an annulment destroys all privilege as to communications made
between husband and wife while the spousal relationship existed. 52 The flaw
in this argument is that a voidable marriage, unlike one that is absolutely
void, is not treated as a non-status for all purposes. Children born of the
marriage are legitimate, 53 and the profits of the marriage are subject to divi-
sion as community property. 54 A statute concerning privileged communica-
tions should be strictly construed. The court drew the wrong inference from
the cases involving the application of the statute to divorced spouses. The
more appropriate response to this reasoning would be to treat the voidable
marriage like one dissolved by divorce.
Loss of Consortium and Wrongful Death. The Texas Supreme Court in
Gracia v. R. C. Cola- 7-Up Bottling Co.55 addressed the issue of whether set-
tlement of a claim for injuries sustained by a minor child barred the mother
from bringing suit for loss of the child's companionship. The father and the
child had been injured in an accident caused by the defendant's employee.
The father sued for damages and both parents sued as the child's next friend
to recover the child's damages. After a settlement was reached on these
claims, the mother brought suit for loss of the child's companionship. The
supreme court found that the mother had an independent cause of action for
her own loss due to the child's injury, which was independent of her hus-
band's cause of action. 56 If the wife had participated in her own right in the
prior settlement, however, she could not pursue her claim for loss of consor-
tium. 57 The court held that the evidence presented showed that the wife
adversely testifying against the other spouse about matters occurring while married and creates
a privilege that must be asserted if the parties are divorced.
49. 669 S.W.2d at 834.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 835. The divorced wife can testify to nonconfidential matters, and the burden to
object is placed on the spouse claiming confidential communications. Bear v. State, 612
S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Foster v. State, 493 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973). The fact that the matter at issue occurred during the marriage does not, in itself,
make such a matter privileged. Curd v. State, 217 S.W. 1043, 1044 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920).
The court in Bruni also overruled the husband's contention on a procedural ground, stating
that he only objected to his wife's competency to testify and not to the content of her testi-
mony. 669 S.W.2d at 835. Therefore, even if the husband could have claimed a privilege, he
waived this right because his objection was improper. Id.; Hodge v. State, 631 S.W.2d 754,
757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Kipperman v. State, 626 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981).
52. 669 S.W.2d at 834-35.
53. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(d) (Vernon 1980).
54. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
55. 667 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1984).
56. Id. at 519 (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978)).
57. 667 S.W.2d at 519; see Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar, 496 S.W.2d 531, 532
(Tex. 1973); Griffin v. Holiday Inns of Am., 496 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1973).
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participated in the prior settlement only as next friend of the child and not
individually. 58 Thus her claim for loss of consortium was not barred. 59
The issue of whether an observer of an accident in which a close relative is
killed may recover for mental anguish when the decedent's negligence ex-
ceeds that of the defendant was dealt with in Dawson v. Garcia.6° When
vehicles driven by the plaintiff's husband and the defendant collided at an
intersection, the decedent's passengers were his wife and two children, who
sought recovery for shock and mental suffering allegedly caused by observ-
ing the infliction of mortal injuries to the husband-father. The jury found
that the decedent was seventy-five percent at fault, thereby relieving the de-
fendant of any primary liability to the plaintiffs under the Texas Compara-
tive Negligence Act.6 1 Relying heavily on California authority,62 the court
concluded that absent preponderant, or primary, liability of the tortfeasor
for the victim's death, an observer had no claim for mental anguish resulting
from the accident. 6 3 Since the Texas statute relieves a defendant from pri-
mary liability if he is less negligent than the plaintiff, the defendant is re-
lieved of fault as to third parties. 64 A claim for mental anguish resulting
from observing a fatal accident is derivative, just as the cause of action for
loss of consortium is derivative. If no principal right of recovery exists, no
derivative right is available.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Tort Recovery. The parents in Williams v. Steves Industries, Inc. 65 sued for
wrongful death when their children were killed in an automobile accident.
The jury found the defendant seventy-five percent liable and the mother,
who drove the car involved in the accident, twenty-five percent liable. On
appeal the parents contended that the husband's portion of damages due to
loss of the children's companionship should not be reduced because of his
wife's negligence. The court agreed, characterizing the loss of the children's
companionship as separate property.66 The court compared the loss of the
58. 667 S.W.2d at 519-20. The court found that the original pleadings stated that the wife
acted only as next friend of the child and that the parties did not intend that the wife be bound
by the settlement. Id. at 519. Although the judgment purported to award damages to the
husband and wife individually, each element of damages recovered satisfied a claim of the
husband alone. The bulk of the judgment was separate property of the husband. Graham v.
Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972) (damages for pain and suffering are separate prop-
erty of injured spouse). Only a small sum awarded for the wife's medical bills and expenses
was community. 667 S.W.2d at 520.
59. 667 S.W.2d at 520. The court also dismissed the bottling company's second assertion
that the settlement constituted an accord and satisfaction between the parties. The court held
that the settlement did not state that it was in full and final settlement of all claims and hence
did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. Id. at 520.
60. 666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
61. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1985) bars recovery by any
person whose negligence exceeds that of the defendant.
62. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
63. 666 S.W.2d at 260.
64. Id.; see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1985).
65. 678 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ granted).
66. Id. at 210. Because the value of the loss of companionship was separate property,
19851
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children's companionship to loss of spousal consortium and found no dis-
tinction between the two.
67
Inception of Title. Marital property is characterized at inception of title.
Such characterization occurs when a right or claim to property is fixed,
though the actual receipt of title may occur at a later time when the acquir-
ing person's marital status may have changed. 68 The Amarillo appeals court
recently applied this basic principle to a situation in which the husband,
prior to marriage, contracted to purchase realty under a lease-option agree-
ment. The deed evidencing the transfer was placed in escrow, to be deliv-
ered upon the completion of payments of a predetermined amount.
69
Payment was made and the deed was delivered subsequent to the grantee's
marriage. The court ruled that, despite the facts that payment was made
from community funds and title had not fully vested prior to marriage, in-
ception of title occurred upon execution of the agreement that gave the hus-
band a claim to the property upon fulfillment of the escrow conditions.
70
In Hardin v. Hardin71 the husband had been made a participant of a re-
tirement trust of a professional association by which he had been employed
for over thirty years. Upon divorce the trial court characterized his interest
as separate property and awarded it to him. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the trust fund interest was received as a gift.72 The court
stressed the fact that the ex-husband did not expect the trust benefit as com-
pensation for his employment. The interest was thus distinguished from an
interest in a retirement pension plan, which is an earned property right.
73
The employer received no benefit by providing the trust fund. Thus the hus-
band's interest was much like a legacy for faithful service when no wages are
due.
Reimbursement. The Texas Supreme Court has rendered two very signifi-
cant decisions on the characterization of an increase in value of separately
owned corporate stocks when the increase is attributable to the expenditure
of time and effort by the owner-spouse. In Vallone v. Vallone74 the court
held that the community must be reimbursed when community time, talent,
and labor, beyond that amount necessary for mere maintenance and preser-
vation of the separate estate, is used to enhance the value of a spouse's sepa-
rate property.75 The court elaborated on the point in Jensen v. Jensen,76
imputed negligence would not bar the non-negligent spouse's recovery. Graham v. Franco,
488 S.W.2d 390, 397 (Tex. 1972). The defendant should be entitled to a twenty-five percent
contribution from the wife, if pleaded.
67. 678 S.W.2d at 210.
68. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 526-27, 44 S.W. 281, 287 (1891).
69. Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
70. Id. at 531.
71. 681 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
72. Id. at 242-43.
73. Id. at 243.
74. 644 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1982).
75. Id.
76. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). For more extensive discussions of Jensen, see McKnight,
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holding that in order to arrive at the amount to which the community is
entitled the trial court must find the value of the labor expended and then
subtract the amount of actual compensation received as well as the value of
efforts reasonably necessary to maintain the separate estate. 77 Holloway v.
Holloway78 involved a similar issue. The husband had parlayed initial sepa-
rate property investments of $1,000 and $3,000 into two closely held corpo-
rations valued at $30,000,000 and $60,000,000 respectively. Consistent with
Vallone and Jensen, the court held that the stock was entirely separate prop-
erty, subject only to a community claim for reimbursement for the uncom-
pensated value of the husband's efforts. 79
The court's position in Holloway is ambiguous with respect to pleading a
claim for reimbursement, however. In Vallone, Jensen, and Holloway the
wife failed to plead specifically for reimbursement and relied instead on the
position that the enhanced value of the stock was community property. In
Vallone the court refused to remand for a new trial in the absence of reim-
bursement pleadings. Thirteen months later in Jensen the court remanded
for a new trial.80 Although in his concurring opinion Justice Robertson ex-
pressed the view that the court had thereby returned to a more liberal policy
of construing pleadings in divorce cases involving reimbursement claims,8'
the supreme court's handling of the case is better seen as an instance of trial
by consent with respect to the reimbursement issue. That the court meant to
depart from the strict pleading rule so recently and clearly announced in
Vallone seems very unlikely. In Holloway the court initially seemed to fol-
low Vallone but, on motion for rehearing after Jensen, remanded the case for
a determination of the amount of reimbursement. 82 The court thus seems to
have retreated from its earlier conclusion that the parties had not tried the
issue by implied consent.83
In another case concerning pleading for reimbursement, Hilton v.
Hilton,84 the court held that in a pleading for reimbursement of separate
property used to retire a community debt an allegation is not required that
the separate expenditure exceeded the benefits received by the community.85
Even if it is necessary in the converse context to allege the extent that the
community estate is benefited when the community estate expends funds to
Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 137-39 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey]; McKnight, Reimbursement for Uncom-
pensated Labor Rendered for a Closely-Held Corporation, State B. Litigation Sec. Rep., 3 THE
ADVOCATE, Dec. 1984, at 8 (As indicated infra notes 102-13, the author's crystal ball, if not
his logical ability, was very badly clouded when this prophecy was cast.); Note, Community
Entitled to Reimbursement for Enhanced Value of Separately Owned Corporate Stock, 16 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 177 (1984).
77. 665 S.W.2d at 110.
78. 671 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd).
79. Id. at 58.
80. 665 S.W.2d at 110.
81. Id. at 110-11.
82. 671 S.W.2d at 63.
83. Id. at 58.
84. 678 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
85. Id. at 648.
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discharge a separate debt, because the separate estate is normally entitled to
an offset for that amount,8 6 in the dispute before the court in Hilton the
situation was different. The court stated that the separate estate could not
possibly benefit from the retirement of a community debt and, therefore,
pleading of benefit would be irrelevant.87 The more significant message in
Hilton, however, was that the separate estate was entitled to reimbursement
for payment of a community obligation regardless of the reason for which
the community debt was incurred. The community indebtedness was alleg-
edly incurred to provide family living expenses. This argument against reim-
bursement was clearly predicated on the holding in Norris v. Vaughan88 that
separate payment for family living expenses are not reimbursable.8 9 The
court's conclusion in Hilton, therefore, allows the rule in Norris to be cir-
cumvented by separate payment of a community debt incurred for living
expenses rather than outright separate payments for living expenses.
The supreme court in Jensen enumerated particular factors to be consid-
ered in determining the amount of reimbursement due the community in a
corporate compensation case. 90 In that instance, the court said that the re-
imbursable amount is the value of all labor performed, less salary and bo-
nuses paid, fringe benefits enjoyed, and dividends received. 91 A comparison
of the court's opinion in Jensen with its conclusions in a superseded opin-
ion 92 seems to indicate that the fact finder should not consider the enhanced
value of the stock in computing the value of the community time and effort
expended. The contrary assertion by the El Paso court in Trawick v.
Trawick93 is apparently attributable to a printer's error.94 In Trawick the
court also discussed whether the enhanced value of the separate estate im-
posed an upper limit on recovery, but because the court was not confronted
with that issue, it did not decide it.95 The present worth of the shares held
should be irrelevant to the computation of the debt owed for inadequate
compensation paid. In Jacobs v. Jacobs,96 on the other hand, the court con-
cluded that a claimant for reimbursement must plead and prove not only
that the other spouse's efforts enhanced the value of his separate corporate
stock but also that this effort extended beyond what was necessary for main-
tenance of the separate corporate interest and that the community did not
receive adequate compensation for his efforts. 97 The court found no evi-
86. Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147-48, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943).
87. 678 S.W.2d at 648.
88. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
89. Id. at 502-03, 260 S.W.2d at 683.
90. 665 S.W.2d at 110.
91. Id.
92. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68, 69-70 (Nov. 9, 1983) (opinion withdrawn). This statement
from that opinion was pointedly omitted.
93. 671 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
94. Id. Without the word "not" in line 31, page 108, the sentence makes no sense in
context.
95. Id. at 109.
96. 668 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), rev'd on another ground, 28
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 337 (Apr. 3, 1985).
97. Id. at 762.
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dence of the latter two requirements and, therefore, reversed the trial court's
award of reimbursement.98
In its Jensen opinion the court made no mention of the countervailing
equities considered in cases involving reimbursement in other contexts. In
its Dakan99 decision of 1935 the court indicated that the widow's reimburse-
ment for her share of community property used to improve the separate
homestead should be equitably reduced because the widow would have a
lifetime enjoyment of the premises. °° In a succession case, as opposed to a
divorce case, one might argue that if the widow is a recipient of a legacy of
the husband's separate shares, similar equities might be taken into considera-
tion to reduce the amount of community reimbursement for uncompensated
labor expended to enhance the value of the separate shares. Such considera-
tions may be immaterial, however, if the Jensen and Trawick approach to
reimbursement cause the courts to move away from a loosely defined right of
reimbursement to a strict, mathematical calculation in which such equities
may no longer be relevant. In making a careful enumeration of factors to be
considered in a corporate compensation case, the supreme court seems to
have defined the computation of reimbursement by the application of precise
rules that give little, if any, leeway for the operation of discretion.
Some of these conclusions and arguments derived from Jensen '0 1 are put
in some doubt by the Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in Anderson v.
Gilliland.10 2 There the deceased husband's heir claimed his share of com-
munity reimbursement for community improvements made to the wife's sep-
arate property during marriage. Saying that the issue had not been
previously resolved or that the authorities were so garbled that one could not
tell whether the issue had been previously dealt with by the court or not,1
0 3
the court concluded that the proper measure of reimbursement is the en-
hancement contributed to the benefited estate and not the amount ex-
pended.10 4 In so holding the court recognized that a simple, uniform cost
test would be easier to plead and to apply, but that the application of such a
rule would, in the court's view, produce inequitable results:
10 5
98. Id.
99. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 319, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935).
100. Id. at 319, 83 S.W.2d at 628.
101. See supra note 76.
102. 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1965). Decisions of courts of appeals immediately following
Jensen illustrate three different approaches to the measure of reimbursement for improve-
ments: (1) cost, Fyffe v. Fyffe, 670 S.W.2d 360, 361-62 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ
dism'd); (2) enhancement, Cook v. Cook, 665 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Padon v. Padon, 670 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no
writ); and (3) cost or enhancement, whichever is less, Anderson v. Gilliland, 677 S.W.2d 105,
108-09 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984) (in this instance cost was less than enhancement), rev'd, 684
S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985).
103. 684 S.W.2d at 674.
104. Id. at 674-75.
105. Id. at 675. "This is true because the estate which contributes the capital necessary to
construct the improvements would not share in the increase in value resulting from the invest-
ment." Id. But in explaining its choice of the "reimbursement" over the "ownership" theory
of recovery for increased value of enhanced separate property in Jensen, the court said that the
contributing community estate did not maintain an interest in the property benefited. Jensen,
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[I]t is incumbent upon the courts to insure that the benefited estate is
not required to pay more in reimbursement than the amount in which it
was benefited by the other estate. 10 6 Likewise, it is necessary to ascer-
tain that the benefited estate pays no less than it has been benefited. 107
The court's assertion that to apply a measure of reimbursement other than
enhancement would be unfair to the spouse whose estate supplies the bene-
fit' 0 8 seems inconsistent with common marital experience. The expectation
of the marital relationship is one of return of that which is lent or advanced
unless otherwise agreed by the spouses. "When are you going to pay back
the $1,000 I let you have?" or "When can I have the $6,500 I spent on the
roof for your rent house?" are the typical marital responses to requested
advancements that give rise to rights of reimbursement. As between the
spouses the subsequent deterioration of the shingles or hail damage to the
roof should be as irrelevant as their replacement cost. When a spouse volun-
tarily expends marital funds or efforts on behalf of another marital estate,
there is even less expectation of receiving more or less than was expended.
In addition to the decisions of lower appellate courts, the court specifically
relied on Sharp v. Stacy,10 9 a case in which a good faith adverse possessor
was awarded reimbursement in the amount of enhancement for betterments
provided to the land possessed. The same measure of recovery applies to the
reimbursement of a tenant in common who contributes improvements to a
common estate.110 But the situations of the cotenant and the adverse posses-
sor are different from that of the marital claimant. Each of the former must
justify his right to reimbursement for improvements made without the coten-
ant's or the owner's consent.I 1 He puts his capital at risk. Marriage is not
and should not be a relationship requiring that sort of proof. Nor is there an
anticipation between spouses that the advancement will either grow or di-
minish during the marriage. In an apparent attempt to lay down a uniform
rule for the measure of reimbursement in cases of cotenancies, betterments
and marital property improvements, the court missed a golden opportunity
to lay down a more pressingly needed uniform rule for all marital reimburse-
ment cases: that cost or value contributed at the date of contribution is the
measure of reimbursement. 1 2 The law would have been greatly simplified if
cases of improvements and other increases in value due to contributions of
one marital estate by another marital estate were the same as that for pay-
665 S.W.2d at 109. "The 'reimbursement' theory provides that the stock, as it appreciates,
remains the separate property of the owner spouse." Id.
106. That a benefited separate estate should ever pay less than the amount expended for its
benefits seems strikingly inequitable, when one considers that it is under the constant control
of its owner.
107. 684 S.W.2d at 675.
108. Id.
109. 535 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. 1976).
110. Whitmore v. Powell, 103 Tex. 232, 236, 125 S.W. 889, 890 (1910).
111. See Shaw & Estes v. Texas Consol. Oils, 299 S.W.2d 307, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1957, writ refd n.r.e.) (cotenancy).
112. Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147-48, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943); Schmidt v.
Huppmann, 73 Tex. 112, 116, 11 S.W. 175, 176-77 (1889).
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ment of debts and improper disposition of assets. 113
Tracing and Commingling. The opinion in Holloway also addressed the
characterization of property purchased during marriage with borrowed
funds. In Gleich v. Bongio114 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
mere intent of the spouses cannot control the character of property bor-
rowed or purchased on credit; rather, an agreement on the part of the lender
or seller to look solely to the separate estate of one of the spouses for repay-
ment is determinative. 1 5 In Holloway the husband borrowed $3,000 to start
a corporation. Although there was no express agreement on the lender's
part to look solely to his separate estate for satisfaction of the indebtedness,
the Dallas court found ample evidence of such an implied agreement.1 16
The loan proceeds were deposited by agreement to an account designated as
the husband's separate property; the note, security agreement, and statement
of purpose for the loan were signed by the husband as a separate borrower;
and only separate property was given as collateral. The court held such evi-
dence capable of sustaining the inference that the bank agreed to look only
to the husband's separate property for payment. 17
Alimony. The Texas Legislature has long resisted suggestions that the courts
be authorized to award alimony in a divorce decree. In Francis v. Francis118
the Texas Supreme Court held in 1967 that spouses might contract for the
payment of such maintenance and the courts might incorporate this purely
contractual agreement into the decree. 19 In 1981 the legislature went a step
further to provide that a divorce court may order the agreed payments. 120 A
divorced spouse thus often deducts such payments from gross income for
federal income tax purposes. 12 1 At the core of the dispute in Benedict v.
Commissioner122 was the question of whether the ex-husband could deduct
as alimony a periodic payment pursuant to the property division in a 1975
divorce. 123 The Revenue Service argued that the payments that the ex-hus-
113. The conclusion in Anderson may. have more serious results than failure to state a
consistent rule for all marital reimbursement cases. It also unsettles the application of the
Jensen principle in stock value cases. Is the measure of reimbursement in such a case the value
of services rendered at the date the services were performed or as reflected in the enhanced
value of the stock that the services produced? If the latter, the reimbursement claimant in a
Jensen-type case will really get all the benefits of the proportional ownership, after all.
114. 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
115. Id. at 612, 99 S.W.2d at 884.
116. 671 S.W.2d at 57.
117. Id.
118. 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
119. Id. at 32.
120. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985). But see Klise v. Klise, 678
S.W.2d 545, 547-48 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (trial judge not obligated
to adopt agreed child support, but has discretion to make his own orders regarding child
support).
121. I.R.C. § 215 (1982) provides for deduction of one spouse's alimony payments if the
alimony is included in the other spouse's gross income.
122. 82 T.C. 573 (1984).
123. For a comment on the division on divorce, see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 122-23 (1977).
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band called alimony were actually part of the property division and thus
nondeductible. But the Tax Court held he could deduct these payments as
alimony because they fitted the criteria under the Internal Revenue Code in
order to be classified as alimony. 124
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Disposition of Jointly Managed Community Property. In 1974 in Williams v.
Portland State Bank 125 the Beaumont court of appeals held that one spouse
might unilaterally mortgage his half interest in nonhomestead, jointly man-
aged community realty.126 After a motion for a writ of error was granted by
the Texas Supreme Court, the parties settled their dispute and the motion
was dismissed as moot. The decision is nonetheless erroneous in that it
somehow interpreted joint management of community property under sec-
tion 5.22(b) 12 7 as meaning several management. 128 This interpretation was
particulary startling because it was reached soon after the supreme court had
concluded that the statute defining joint management means exactly what it
says.' 29 Citing Williams, the court in Vallone v. Miller 30 pronounced a mis-
leading dictum to the effect that one spouse may unilaterally convey his half
interest in jointly managed, community realty, though the court purported
to be guided in this instance by section 5.22(c).131 Subsection (c), however,
also deals with joint management, which cannot mean anything but con-
certed action.' 32 The actual holding of the case is correct: the husband,
acting alone, could not dispose of a tract of jointly owned, community prop-
erty without his wife's joinder. 133 The grantee sought specific performance
of the contract and wholly failed. The court merely added the inaccurate
observation that the husband might have sold his half interest in the prop-
124. 82 T.C. at 578-79. The court listed seven factors that, if found to exist, showed the
payments were alimony: (1) the parties did not intend the payments to be a division of assets;
(2) the recipient did not surrender valuable property rights in exchange for the payments;
(3) the payments are subject to contingencies; (4) the payments are not secured; (5) the amount
of payments plus other property exceeds one-half of the property the parties accumulated dur-
ing the marriage; (6) the need of the recipient is taken into account; (7) the provision does not
provide for support elsewhere in the decree. Id. at 578. In Benedict the court found that the
payments were subject to contingencies, were unsecured, constituted more than one-half the
property, were for the wife's need, and that the decree contained no other provision concerning
support. Id. The court took these factors from Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275, 1284-85
(1981).
125. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd as moot after
settlement).
126. Id. at 126-27.
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (Vernon 1975).
128. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 88-89
(1975).
129. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1972). Husband's unilateral
action to rescind community purchase of real estate was dismissed with prejudice. Husband
and wife then refiled the suit together, and the court held that the previous dismissal was not
res judicata as to wife, because she had joint control of the community property. Id. at 205.
130. 663 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 98.
132. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975).
133. 663 S.W.2d at 98.
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erty had he purported to deal only with his share.1 34
Liability of Spouses to Third Persons. Although a divorce court may order
either spouse to pay a particular joint liability, the other spouse is not
thereby freed of liability. If the creditor intervenes in the proceeding, the
court cannot reorder liability as between the creditor and the spousal debtors
unless all parties consent to the novation. This proposition was recently reit-
erated in Wileman v. Wade.135 The divorce court may do no more than
adjust the mode of payment as between the debtors; 136 the creditor's rights
are not disturbed. 137 In Wileman the trial court found that liability for an
attorney's fee contracted by the wife in connection with obtaining the di-
vorce was a community debt and ordered each spouse to discharge half of it.
It does not appear from the opinion that the trial court made a finding that
the debt was a necessary. 138 In reforming the judgment to hold that both
spouses were jointly liable for payment of the fee, the Dallas appellate court
did not rely on the law of necessaries but on the conclusion that the liability
was a community debt. 139 In his dissent Justice Sparling implicitly rejected
both approaches. Characterizing the debt as a community obligation, he
argued, does not necessarily subject the husband to liability."40 In determin-
ing whether the noncontracting spouse is liable in such instances, the court
should look to the husband's express or implied assent, acknowledgment of
liability, and all other surrounding circumstances. 141 Under these require-
ments, the dissenting judge would have absolved the husband of liability.142
Evidently the judge's view is that the old law, by which the wife was the
husband's agent of necessity in such cases, has been superseded by the equal
rights amendment to the Texas Constitution and a series of legislative acts
and judicial decisions of the past two decades. 143 He would replace the time-
worn and outmoded notion of agency of necessity with one of factual
agency, implemented by the statutory injunction that each spouse has the
duty to support the other. The dissenting judge's points are well taken.
All debts contracted by either spouse during marriage are presumed to be
134. Id. at 99.
135. 665 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
136. McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community Property for Obligations of Spouses to
Strangers, in CREDITOR'S RIGHTS IN TEXAS 331, 340-42 (J. McKnight ed. 1963). With partic-
ular reference to attorney's fees, see McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce,
8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 456 n.252 (1976).
137. 665 S.W.2d at 520.
138. Id. at 521; see Black v. Bryan, 18 Tex. 453, 464-65 (1857).
139. 665 S.W.2d at 520.
140. Id. at 522.
141. 665 S.W.2d at 522 (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex.
1975); Leblanc v. Walter, 603 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ); Miller v. City Nat'l Bank, 594 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ)).
142. 665 S.W.2d at 523.
143. See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
455-59 (1976); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 84-85
(1976) [hereinafter cited ast McKnight, 1976 Annual Survey]; see also Donovan v. Mercer, 747
F.2d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984) (wife did not act as husband's agent, but was personally liable
for her own breach of fiduciary duty).
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community obligations for the purpose of characterizing property bought on
credit or with money borrowed by either spouse. The character of the debt
is rebuttable by a showing that the creditor agreed to look solely to separate
property for its satisfaction. The Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District
of Texas discussed this proposition in In re Karber.144 The issue in Karber
was whether the wife was jointly liable for a business debt contracted by the
husband. The creditor asserted that because the liability had community
character, the wife was jointly liable, thereby causing her separate property
to be answerable in satisfaction. In Karber the court followed the Texas
Supreme Court's analysis in Cockerham v. Cockerham, l45 in which the court
found that the obligation was indeed a community obligation because the
creditor had not agreed to look solely to the husband's separate estate, 146 but
the creditor must also prove that these community debts were joint obliga-
tions of the wife before her separate property might be made liable for their
discharge.' 47 In such a circumstance, the court in Cockerham held, the
creditor must prove that the wife implicitly assented to the husband's
debt.' 48 In Karber the court found that the wife had not assented because
her affirmative act reflected her refusal in this regard to encumber her sepa-
rate estate. 149
The Tyler court of appeals expressed the view in Humphrey v. Taylor 50
that the source of repayment particularly contemplated by the creditor and
the attitude of the other spouse indicate whether a community liability is
jointly incurred.' 5' The husband executed a promissory note for a loan
without his wife's knowledge. When the couple sought a divorce, the lender
intervened, seeking a judgment on the note against both spouses. Based
upon the lender's testimony that in extending the loan he had no "intent as
far as the estate was concerned except if it came time for collection I would
try to collect however I could,"1 52 the court ruled that neither the wife's
separate property nor the community property interest subject to the sole
management of the wife was liable for the debt.15 3 The court also relied
upon evidence showing that the wife had no knowledge of the transaction
until the creditor notified her that the note was in default, and that she had
144. 25 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
145. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975). In Cockerham the court found that the husband was
jointly liable for the debts of the wife's dress shop, because of the husband's involvement in the
business as a principal. In its opinion in Cockerham the court (somewhat ambiguously) laid
out the rules concerning imposition of joint liability in such circumstances. See McKnight,
1976 Annual Survey, supra note 143, at 91-92.
146. 527 S.W.2d at 171-72.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 172.
149. 25 Bankr. at 13. The wife testified that she had been opposed to the acquisition of the
business. Though she had signed some of the notes under apparent duress, she then had coun-
termanded her husband's instructions to her attorney to prepare documents to place a lien on
her property. She also had refused to sign a personal guaranty that her husband had urged
upon her.
150. 673 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
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neither received any proceeds of the loan nor had she participated in any
part of the transaction. 15 4 Following the supreme court's analysis in Cock-
erham, the court concluded that both spouses were not jointly liable on the
note. 155 A far easier and better way to arrive at the same conclusion is
merely to follow the rules of liability prescribed by section 5.61 of the Family
Code. Under those provisions contractual liability falls on the maker of the
contractual obligation and on all community property of which he or she is
the sole or joint manager. The separate property and the community prop-
erty subject to the sole management of the nonmaker is not liable for such
obligations.156 Tortious liability is somewhat different: all community prop-
erty may be reached in satisfaction of either spouse's liability. 157 This rule is
ameliorated somewhat by the marshalling statute, section 5.62, whereby a
court may direct the order in which various types of community, or sepa-
rate, property may be made subject to satisfaction. 158
In Estate of Fulmer v. Commissioner159 the United States Tax Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a deceased spouse's estate could deduct the en-
tire amount of a tort judgment against the estate in computing estate tax
liability. A judgment had been rendered against the deceased husband's es-
tate for a personal tort committed by the decedent. The court ordered the
judgment paid first from the separate estate of the decedent and then from
his share of the community before payment from the widow's share. The
probate court confirmed this order of full payment from the husband's es-
tate. The Revenue Service argued that because the Family Code provides
that the community is subject to all tortious liability, 16° the estate could de-
duct only half of the liability, and the decedent's wife's share of the commu-
nity would be liable for the other half.16 1 In ruling in favor of the estate, 162
the Tax Court effectively extended the scope of section 5.62163 to allow mar-
shalling of payment against a decedent's share of community property parti-
tioned at death.
The Corpus Christi appeals court ruled that the husband of a purchaser of
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(b) (Vernon 1975).
157. Id. § 5.61(d).
158. Id. § 5.62.
159. 83 T.C. 302 (1984).
160. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975).
161. The separate property of the decedent would also have been liable, but the estate had
no separate assets.
162. 83 T.C. at 308-09. Section 5.61 of the Family Code pertains to the spouse's marital
liability, while § 5.62, the marshalling statute, determines the order in which property subject
to liability under § 5.61 may be reached by the creditor. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.61,
5.62 (Vernon 1975).
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.62 (Vernon 1975). The court concluded that the marshal-
ling statute applied to tort judgments because if the tort claim had been partly satisfied out of
the wife's share of the community, the wife would have had a claim of reimbursement against
the husband's estate. 83 T.C. at 308. The court inferred that a Texas court would reach the
same result as that reached by a Washington court in that situation. See deElche v. Jacobson,
95 Wash. 2d 236, 622 P.2d 835, 840-41 (1980). For a discussion of community liability for a




realty was not an indispensable party to his spouse's action seeking return of
the earnest money paid by her when the husband was in no sense a party to
the transaction. 164 The court noted, however, that if the husband had been a
third-party beneficiary to the contract, he might have been a proper party to
the suit.' 65 Because the husband had not assented to this status, the court
concluded that he was not a necessary party to the resolution of the
dispute. ' 66
Homestead. Nature of the Interest. A twice divorced homeowner resided
during his two marriages and afterwards in the same urban home. Because
he was finally divorced before the 1973 amendment to the Texas Constitu-
tion,1 67 which allowed a single adult to claim a homestead, the trial court
concluded that a judgment creditor was entitled to levy upon the asserted
homestead. The appellate court reversed:' 68 divorce does not cause a family
home to lose its homestead character as long as the owner with parental
obligations remains in possession and uses the property as his homestead.1 69
This decision is merely a new example of a well-established principle,170
since the claimant had reared two sons in the designated property. The
Texas Supreme Court had gone a step further in Renaldo v. Bank of San
Antonio' 7' in allowing a single father to acquire a new homestead after di-
vorce so that his minor child could visit him there.1 72
Apart from federal liability a homestead may not be encumbered by liens
other than for purchase money, property taxes, and improvements.1 73 The
transfer of one spouse's community interest to the other on divorce raises a
question as to whether the deprived spouse's right to a money judgment in
lieu of her interest can be secured by a lien on the premises. That question is
resolved by awarding a species of purchase-money lien on the homestead to
secure the monetary award granted to the spouse whose interest is trans-
ferred to the other spouse.17 4 In a related context the Texas Supreme Court
164. Major Inv., Inc. v. De Castillo, 673 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
165. Id.
166. Id. In De Castillo the purchaser-wife also asserted that the sales contract was void
under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 130 & 6626c (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985) and TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
167. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. The homestead right of a single person is also reflected
in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1984).
168. McFarland v. Rousseau, 667 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
169. Id. at 931-32.
170. The court followed Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35
(1929), which held that the dissolution of the family does not destroy homestead rights of the
surviving head as long as he uses it as a homestead. Id. at 589, 19 S.W.2d at 35.
171. 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982). The divorce and acquisition of the new property oc-
curred prior to the 1973 constitutional amendment.
172. Id. at 638-40.
173. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; see Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. United States, 573 F.
Supp. 881, 883 (N.D. Tex. 1983). In Kostelnik v. Roberts, 680 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that a homestead cannot be a haven for
ill-gotten gains.
174. Lettieri v. Lettieri, 654 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd), dis-
cussed in McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 154-55. A similar analysis is used
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recently held in McGoodwin v. McGoodwin175 that a divorce court's decree
that the wife transfer her interest in the home to the husband with a money
judgment in her favor implies a vendor's lien on her behalf. 176 The court
reached this conclusion by likening the couple's settlement agreement, which
was incorporated in the decree, to a contract for the purchase of land. The
court then invoked the further analogy that when no express lien is reserved
in a deed and the purchase money is not paid, an implied lien arises as a
matter of law. 177 The court, however, modified the court of appeals' judg-
ment in a manner that clarifies the law in this and related cases: the lien
imposed was only against the wife's interest in the property acquired.1 78
Following older, but unconvincing, authorities, a spouse's right to recover
on a fire insurance policy was rejected in Western Fire Insurance Co. v.
Sanchez179 when the husband willfully destroyed his wife's separate-prop-
erty homestead. Texas courts have often held that the nonowner's posses-
sory right is much like an estate in land, but this court stretched the simile
too far. The homestead right is similar to a life estate,1 80 but differs mark-
edly from a life estate in that no right of lifetime disposition attaches. Fol-
lowing an insurance law principle that a co-owner cannot recover on an
insurance policy when the other co-owner destroys the property, the court
denied the wife recovery on the policy.18' By analogy the court overmagni-
fled the husband's interest, which is not truly analogous to that of a co-
owner in this context. The husband's right is merely that of occupancy. His
intentional damage to the house of course may hinder the enjoyment of that
right, but it should not affect the right of ownership, because the law does
not recognize the husband's right of disposition as it does in the case of a co-
owner. The husband's homestead right, therefore, should not preclude the
wife's recovery under the insurance policy. The contrary argument rests on
the principle that the benefits of the insurance policy inure to the mutual
benefit of all the owners; 182 hence, all co-owners must use all reasonable
to support a purchase money lien when a resident family member sells a homestead interest on
the death of an ancestor.
175. 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984).
176. Id. at 882.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 883. The court also held that the principle of res judicata did not bar the wife
from litigating the issue of the vendor's lien's existence. Id. at 881-82. The court held that the
wife had in effect sought to foreclose a lien created on divorce and, hence, did not seek to
create a lien by her subsequent suit. Id. (citing Debord v. Muller, 446 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1969);
Goldberg v. Goldberg, 425 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ)).
179. 671 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the point of error with
respect to recovery was properly presented, the writ of error seems to have been improvidently
denied.
180. Id. at 668; see Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 351-52, 15 S.W.2d 589, 593 (1929).
For the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Texas law of homestead, see
United States v. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983), discussed in McKnight,
1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 152-53.
181. 671 S.W.2d at 670. Many jurisdictions, however, allow recovery by an innocent co-
owner when the other co-owner intentionally destroys the property. Hosey v. Seibels Bruce
Group, 363 So. 2d 751, 753-54 (Ala. 1978); Steigler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398,
401 (Del. 1978).
182. Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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means to preserve the property. 183 Thus, a co-owner's destruction of the
property renders the whole policy void.184 In Sanchez, however, the policy
was issued to the wife only. 18 5 The husband had no contractual relations
with the insurance company. He was merely involved by operation of the
homestead law. A wrongful act on the part of a lessee would not preclude
recovery of the owner's fire insurance policy, and for that reason the rights
of a tenant at law should have no greater force.
With few exceptions, such as the long-term lease of a home and rental of
mobile home facilities, rented property is not treated as a homestead. 18 6 In
most instances the protection would be meaningless because the lessee's in-
terest is normally not assignable' 87 and is, therefore, immune from seizure
by his creditor. But even if a homestead may be maintained on rented prem-
ises for some purposes, the lessor's interest is not precluded from seizure by
his creditors. In Texas Commerce Bank v. McCreary'"8 after divorce the ex-
husband moved to a house on property he leased to his solely owned corpo-
ration. He thus owned the property, but his occupancy was as a tenant at
will of the lessee. A year after he moved to the property the corporation
executed a promissory note to the bank with the residential realty as secur-
ity. The owner personally guaranteed payment. On default of the note the
bank sought foreclosure of its lien on the property that the occupant claimed
as his homestead. The court held that the property's uninterrupted use as a
rental property to the corporation precluded its qualification as a homestead,
regardless of whether the corporate-owner used it as his residence. 189 The
corporation's permission to use its buildings for living quarters did not estab-
lish an independent right to use the premises as a homestead.19 0 The analy-
sis is somewhat analogous to that of the Texas Commission of Appeals in
Rettig v. Houston West End Realty Co. 191 There a husband and wife had a
rural community homestead of twenty-five acres. After the wife died intes-
Eastland 1952, no writ) (former wife burned homestead); Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp.,
250 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ refd) (former husband burned
homestead).
183. Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1952, writ ref'd).
184. Id. at 283; see also Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423, 425
(1938) (husband's arson was act of insured); Bowers Co. v. London Assur. Corp., 90 Pa.
Super. 121 (1926) (seller of automobile burned by purchaser precluded recovery by seller on
joint policy); Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 349, 189 N.W. 1028, 1028 (1922) (partners
had agreed to use reasonable means to protect property).
185. In Jones the policy was issued to the husband and wife before they were divorced and
the property was awarded to the wife. See Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d
281, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd).
186. Yates v. Home Bldg. & Loan Co., 103 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937,
no writ) (mere intention to stop renting a house and to resume using it as homestead does not
create the right); Blackwell v. Lasseter, 203 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1918), aff'd,
227 S.W. 944 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgmt adopted) (intention not enough when property
not used as homestead).
187. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.005 (Vernon 1984).
188. 677 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
189. Id. at 646.
190. Id.
191. 254 S.W. 765 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgmt adopted).
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tate, the husband and son continued to occupy the land. The father allowed
the son to build a house on the land that the son occupied. The son then
purported to sell his interest in the land without his wife's joinder. If the sale
was the son's homestead, the sale was invalid. But because the father had an
exclusive right of homestead occupancy and the son was an occupant as a
tenant at will of the father (though his tenant in common), the son had no
homestead right in the land. 192
Homestead: Designation and Extent. The fact that an owner of land has
never designated it as a homestead for property tax purposes does not pre-
clude a finding that the property is, nevertheless, his homestead.1 93 This
proposition was recently restated. The property is a homestead because the
claimant used it as such. Assertion of an ad valorem tax exemption is evi-
dence of such use, but failure to designate for that purpose does not preclude
the homestead claim by the owner in another context.194
In Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Loomis' 95 the issue was whether home-
stead property acquired in 1954 for more than $5,000 (but less than $10,000)
was entirely exempt based upon the 1970 Texas constitutional amendment
raising the homestead exemption of an urban lot from $5,000 to $10,000 "at
the time of [its] designation."'' 96 The creditor, whose post-amendment debt
had been reduced to judgment, asserted the right to levy upon the excess
over the initial exemption. In holding for the homestead claimant, the ap-
pellate court admitted that its decision effectively established the retroactiv-
ity of the amendment and concluded that such was the intention of its
framers.197 The court distinguished the situation before it from that in
Linch v. Broad198 and cases decided in reliance thereon, in that Linch in-
volved a claimant who had tried to enlarge the area of his homestead follow-
ing an amendment of the Texas Constitution that enlarged the dollar
amount exempted. 199 Instead, the court followed Wilder v. McConnell,200 a
case that dealt with the issue of whether land that was rural at the time of
192. Id. at 767-68.
193. Dodd v. Harper, 670 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ). To
establish homestead rights the claimant must show a combination of both overt acts of home-
stead usage and intention on the part of the owner to claim the land as homestead. Lifemark
Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Prince v. North State Bank, 484 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
194. Dodd v. Harper, 670 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, no writ).
195. 672 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
197. 672 S.W.2d at 310-11.
198. 70 Tex. 92, 6 S.W. 751 (1888).
199. 672 S.W.2d at 311. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 was amended in 1970 to increase the
dollar amount from $5,000 to $10,000. The court concluded that cases that would not allow
the homestead claimant to take advantage of an increase in the dollar amount of the home-
stead exemption when applied to the original property were a result of a misreading of Linch.
See Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (statutory homestead
designation not retroactive); In re Bobbitt, 3 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), affid, 532
F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) (increase not retroactive).
200. 91 Tex. 600, 45 S.W. 145 (1898).
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designation had become urban at the time of trial. In Wilder the supreme
court had stated that the exemption must be determined by the terms of the
Constitution applicable to it when the question of exemption arose.20 1 Reli-
ance on Wilder is misplaced, as is demonstrated by the supreme court's brief
opinion in Love v. Hoffman. 20 2
In 1983 the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Rod-
gers20 3 that a federal district court may order the sale of a deceased, delin-
quent, federal taxpayer's homestead even if the nondelinquent surviving
spouse also has a homestead interest in the property. 2° 4 In United States v.
Molina20 5 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas de-
termined the allocation of the proceeds among the United States, the delin-
quent spouse, and the nondelinquent spouse, both of whom were still living.
In Molina, two couples owned undivided one-half interests in the property
seized by the Revenue Service, but one of the couples did not live on the
property and asserted no homestead claim therein. The other couple as-
serted that the property was their homestead. Both husbands were liable for
unpaid employment taxes. The evidence indicated that the first couple's in-
terest was community property; hence, the whole of their interest could be
applied to satisfy the deficiency on their joint income tax return. 20 6 The
proceeds of the second couple's half interest was apportioned differently be-
cause of its homestead character. Since the wife was not liable for the un-
paid taxes, the court held that her interest in the homestead was distinct
from her community property interest and, hence, would not be liable.20 7
The court found that her interest approximated a life estate and so evaluated
it by calculating the present discounted value of a life estate, using actuarial
tables. 208 The Revenue Service argued that the classification of the property
as community made it liable for unpaid taxes and overrode the innocent
wife's homestead rights, but the court disagreed. Since the homestead right
was an independent interest, the court concluded that, although the wife's
community ownership interest was liable, her homestead right was pro-
tected. 20 9 On motion to alter or amend the court's findings the court re-
peated its analysis, concluding that the second wife should be compensated
for her one-half homestead interest in the property. 2 10
201. Id. at 604-05, 45 S.W. at 147.
202. 499 S.W.2d 295, 295 (Tex. 1973).
203. 103 S. Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983). For a discussion of Rodgers, see McKnight,
1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 152-54.
204. 103 S. Ct. at 2136, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 244.
205. 584 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
206. Id. at 1013. Although the first wife was not liable for unpaid taxes, the full liability
for the first husband's unpaid taxes could be satisfied from the property because it was jointly
managed community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975); see Short v.
United States, 395 F. Supp. 1151, 1153-54 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
207. 584 F. Supp. at 1014.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1014-15. The court drew its conclusion from Rodgers, finding that the language
of the Supreme Court opinion indicated that regardless of whether ownership rights are sepa-
rate or community property, the nondelinquent spouse has a vested property right in the
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Homestead. Imposing and Enforcing Liens. A forced sale of homestead
property may occur in only three situations: (1) for payment of a purchase
money lien; (2) for payment of taxes due on the property; and (3) for pay-
ment of improvements on the property.2 1' The contract for improvements,
however, must be in writing and executed by both spouses in the case of a
family homestead.2 12 These are long-standing rules with respect to family
homesteads, 2 13 but only recently was the rule with respect to improvements
applied in an appellate case to the homestead of a single person.
In Stewart v. Clark214 a general contractor sued the single co-owners of a
home to fix a lien for improvements made thereon. The contract, however,
was not in writing. The contractor argued that the contract did not have to
be in writing because the owners were unmarried. He stated that the consti-
tutional provision requiring a written agreement for improvements applies
only to a family homestead. Though article XVI, section 50 of the Texas
Constitution2 15 might be given such a narrow construction with a strong
reliance on punctuation, the court rejected this argument. 2 16 As amended in
1973 the constitution extends homestead protection to single adults, and the
court concluded that the homestead of a single person must be on the same
terms as that afforded to a family homestead. 2 17 The court's conclusion is,
of course, supported by the plain provision of article 3839218 and section
41.002 of the Property Code,2 19 which replaced it on January 1, 1984.
In In re Daves220 the creditor had lent the debtor a substantial sum of
money to make improvements on both sites of his urban residential and busi-
ness homestead, relying on the husband's assertion of a prior filing of a
mechanic's lien upon which the owner could rely to obtain a permanent loan
if he could not repay the improvement loans. The debtor, however, had
obtained a release of the mechanic's lien, but did not record it until long
after he had defaulted on the improvement loans. The recordation of the
release, therefore, destroyed any basis for a valid contractual lien because the
lien must have been perfected prior to the beginning of construction to be
homestead that the court must protect. Id. at 1015; see United States v. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at
2138-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 248.
211. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; e.g., Franklin v. Woods, 598 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (decedent's homestead could not be sold to pay debts of
estate).
212. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 states: "[A]nd in this last case [in which the homestead
may be subjected for forced sale for the payment of improvements] only when the work and
material are contracted for in writing with the consent of both spouses, in the case of a family
homestead ....
213. Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Ditto, 566 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (both spouses required to sign instrument creating lien on homestead).
214. 677 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
215. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
216. 677 S.W.2d at 249.
217. Id. The contractor had also asserted that the owner had not proved the homestead
character of the property. The court found that at least one of the co-owners had shown that
the property was her residence. Id. at 250.
218. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3839 (Vernon 1966) (repealed 1984).
219. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 1984).
220. No. 583-00087 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 1984).
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effective. 221 The bankruptcy court put an equitable lien on both properties
because the parties had intended that a lien be created in favor of the lender
and because both properties together constituted the urban homestead.222
Because the owner had an insufficient equity in the business premises to sus-
tain a lien for all of the indebtedness incurred for its improvements, the equi-
table lien for the bulk of the improvements of the business premises fell on
the residential part of the property. The court's decision embellishing Texas
homestead law in favor of a creditor by allowing the imposition of a lien
against homestead property when the constitutional formalities have not
been followed seems wrong in principle, but some authority supports the
court's treatment of the homestead as a unit for the purpose of
encumbrances. 223
The court in Villarreal v. Laredo National Bank224 reiterated the rule that
one spouse could not alone renew a joint lien note when the other spouse still
had homestead rights in the property. By a deed of trust the husband and
wife had put a lien for improvements on their homestead. On divorce the
court granted the property to the husband, but awarded the wife a home-
stead interest in the property until their youngest child reached eighteen.
The ex-husband later executed a lien renewal note upon the bank's assertion
of its right to accelerate the old note for payment under its terms. The old
note, however, remained in effect. When the bank proceeded to foreclose
under the renewal agreement, the wife, asserting her homestead rights, insti-
tuted a suit for a permanent injunction. The trial court denied her claim and
granted the bank summary judgment. On appeal, the San Antonio court of
appeals held that the ex-husband alone had no power to renew or alter the
continuing joint obligation against the homestead. 225 Placing fee title in the
ex-husband alone on divorce did not affect the operation of this fundamental
rule of law.226 Although the bank could foreclose upon the ex-husband's
interest if the property were no longer his homestead, the new title holder
would take subject to the wife's homestead interest as defined by the divorce
decree. The bank could perhaps have forced a sale on the original note
rather than the renewal note, but the court made no disposition on that point
221. Id., slip op. at 12; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
222. No. 583-00087, slip op. at 15-16. An equitable lien is created when a party indicates
an intention to provide certain property as security for repayment of a debt. William Clay, Jr.
Found. v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 628, 631 (N.D. Tex. 1964). Such an equitable lien will
not arise except out of an express or implied contract between the parties. Bray v. Curtis, 544
S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
223. See, e.g., Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (improvement of a rural area around the family home as a mobile home
park constituted an improvement on the homestead property for which the land occupied as
the home was subject to foreclosure). In Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), relied on by the court, it was not shown that the property
was a homestead.
224. 677 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Id. at 608 (citing Uvalde Rock Asphalt v. Hightower, 140 Tex. 200, 166 S.W.2d 681
(1942); Sudduth v. DuBose, 93 S.W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ); San Antonio Real
Estate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, 65 S.W. 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ refd)).
226. 677 S.W.2d at 608. Although the bank could foreclose against the husband's interest,
this right could not affect the wife's homestead interest as long as it existed. Id.
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because the bank argued that the wife was no longer responsible under the
original note because of the renewal. 227 The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's award of summary judgment for the bank, but modified the or-
der to protect the wife's homestead interest. 228 The bank thus could fore-
close and sell the husband's nonhomestead interest, but could not impair the
wife's possessory homestead rights.
Exempt Personalty. In In re Johnson229 the debtor claimed that her tax-
deferred annuity was exempt property in a bankruptcy proceeding. 2 30 The
debtor was a participant in an annuity funded solely from her earnings as an
employee. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the annuity was not
exempt because Texas law exempts only employer-funded benefits.2 31  A
somewhat similar dispute was before a bankruptcy court in In re Roper.
23 2
The debtor asserted that he could exempt funds held in his Teacher Retire-
ment Account. The trustee responded that the debtor can exempt only that
portion contributed by the state in an amount not to exceed allowed personal
property exemptions. 23 3 But the court held that the entire retirement fund
was exempt independent of the $30,000 limit, because that exemption is sep-
arately provided for in a context that imposes no limitation as to amount.
234
The court distinguished the case from Johnson in that the retirement fund in
Roper was partly employer-funded. 235
227. Id. at 608. By taking that position the bank apparently did not assert its right to
foreclose on the original note. In a concurring opinion Justice Dial took the position that the
bank did not waive its right to foreclose under the original note and, therefore, had to proceed
with the notice requirements of that note to make a successful foreclosure. Id. at 609. The
concurring opinion did not discuss the bank's apparent waiver of the wife's liability.
228. Id. at 609. A dissenting judge pointed out, however, that the court should merely
have reversed and rendered in favor of the wife. Id. at 609-10 (Butts, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that since the bank only asserted a denial of the wife's homestead claim and lost
this argument, judgment should be granted in favor of the wife. Id. at 610.
229. 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1984).
230. Texas State College and University Employees Uniform Insurance Benefits Act, TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-3, § 9(a) (Vernon 1981) exempts "[a]ll insurance benefits and other
payments and transactions made pursuant to the provision of this Act to any employee cov-
ered under the provisions of this Act ....
231. 724 F.2d at 1141. The court held that the words "to any employee" were meant to
exempt only employer-provided benefits. The court also determined that the annuity was not
exempt under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon 1981), which exempts annuities paid
on a periodic basis. Since the debtor could elect to receive a lump sum, the annuity was not
exempt under that provision. 724 F.2d at 1142; see also Union Say., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Smith, 62 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1933, writ refd) (construing prior statute).
232. No. 584-50051 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 1984).
233. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984) allows for a $30,000 maximum for
personalty exempted for a family.
234. No. 584-50051, slip op. at 8. The court held the property exempt under TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 10B, § 31.005 (Vernon Pam. 1985), which provides: "[a]ll retirement
allowances, annuities, refunded contributions, optional benefits, money in the various retire-
ment system accounts, and rights accrued or accruing under this subtitle to any person are
exempt from garnishment, attachment, state and municipal taxation, sale, levy, and any other
process, and are unassignable."
235. No. 584-50051, slip op. at 7.
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IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Property Settlements. The Texas Supreme Court concluded in McGoodwin v.
McGoodwin236 that a divorce decree approving a property settlement agree-
ment by which one spouse is allowed to purchase the other spouse's interest
in particular realty establishes a vendor's lien in favor of the seller. 237 The
court drew its analysis from contract law, holding that a marital property
agreement, though incorporated in a divorce decree, is governed by contract
law.238 Unlike the lower court, the court did not rely on the fact that the
divorce decree contained strong language concerning the instruments to be
executed pursuant to the divorce decree.
The decision in McGoodwin may be interpreted as impliedly repudiating
the rule announced in Ex parte Gorena239 that an agreement incorporated in
a judgment is thereafter governed by the law of judgments, rather than that
of contracts, because the agreement is incorporated into the judgment.24° In
its initial opinion in McGoodwin by Justice McGee (later withdrawn) the
court cited a line of authority, including Gorena, in holding the wife must
have sued in the divorce proceeding to obtain a vendor's lien and since she
did not, the issue was res judicata. 241 In its ultimate opinion in McGoodwin
the court, speaking through Justice Barrow, relied on Ex parte Jones242 and
other cases243 for the proposition that the law of contracts governs the en-
forcement of an agreed judgment.244 In Gorena the court had expressly dis-
approved of the analysis in Jones.245 All the implications of the court's
decision cannot yet be discerned, but it seems clear that the court has turned
away from the law of judgments in order to define property settlement agree-
ments under the law of contracts even after the agreement has been incorpo-
rated in the divorce decree. Hence, a respondent may plead contractual
defenses and the successful petitioner cannot enforce his judgment by
contempt.
Following McGoodwin, the Austin court of appeals concluded in Colquette
236. 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984). In its prior opinion, the court held that no implied lien
existed and the seller must have secured an appeal in the divorce proceeding. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 275, 276 (March 14, 1984) (opinion withdrawn).
237. 671 S.W.2d at 882.
238. Id.; Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); Exparte Jones, 163 Tex. 513,
520, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962); Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ).
239. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979).
240. The court of appeals in McGoodwin had indicated that the vendor's lien was inferred
from the language of the decree because it ordered both parties to execute all instruments
necessary to effect its decree. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 656 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1083), rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984). For a discussion of the court of appeals
decision, see McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 155.
241. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 275, 276 (March 14, 1984) (opinion withdrawn) (citing Ex parte
Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979); McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.
1979)).
242. 163 Tex. 513, 520, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962).
243. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 37 (Tex. 1967); Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d
944, 946-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ) (per Barrow, C.J.).
244. 671 S.W.2d at 882.
245. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 844-45.
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v. Forbes246 that a vendor's lien in favor of the husband arose pursuant to a
property settlement agreement incident to the spouses' divorce.247 The ex-
husband sued on a note on the ex-spouses' residence executed in exchange
for the ex-husband's share in the residence. The note provided for accelera-
tion upon the wife's remarriage or cohabitation with an unrelated adult male
at the residence. The court held that this provision created an implied ven-
dor's lien in favor of the ex-husband. 248
In Patterson v. Patterson249 the court considered the construction of an
arguably ambiguous property settlement agreement and the evidence that
the trial court could consider in determining the intent of the parties. The
agreement had awarded particular property to the appellant as her separate
property "subject to the indebtedness thereon." No indebtedness was se-
cured by a lien on the property, but there was an outstanding note for money
used to improve the property. When the appellant realized that there was no
lien on the property, she ceased making payments on the note. The appellee
sued to enforce the agreement. On appeal the appellant contended that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning a prior oral agreement as
to payment of the note. The court of appeals held that parol evidence could
be submitted to determine the parties' intent.250 The court then determined
that the parties intended that the appellant take responsibility for the
debt. 251 The loan was clearly for the benefit of the property, and the fact
that the loan was unsecured was immaterial. 252
A post-divorce partition of community real property alleged by the ex-
wife to have been undivided at divorce was sought in Recio v. Recio.253 To-
ward defeating the former husband's claim that the parties had agreed to an
oral partition of the property, the ex-wife on appeal sought to rely on the
absence of a written agreement. The appellate court held that rule 11254 was
246. 680 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
247. Id. at 538.
248. Id. The divorce decree stated that the wife owned the residence free from any claim of
the husband. The court found this boilerplate language did not constitute a waiver of an im-
plied lien. Id. at 538. Even though the language used was formbook language, it was never-
theless clear, and one wonders why it should have been written off as surplusage. The court
also held the acceleration provision did not violate the wife's right to privacy because she had
freely agreed to the provision. Id. at 539.
249. 679 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
250. Id. at 624-25. The court noted that parol evidence has long been admissible to show
that at the time of execution of a deed the parties had agreed that the grantee would assume
and pay the incumbrance on the property sold. Johnson v. Elmen, 94 Tex. 168, 175, 59 S.W.
253, 255 (1900) (agreement to assume indebtedness not inconsistent with terms of convey-
ance); Bentley v. Andrewartha, 565 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ)
(parol evidence admissible when deed recited nominal consideration); Pucket v. Frizzell, 406
S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ) (parol evidence showed no agreement
to pay indebtedness); Ewing v. McGee, 314 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1958, writ dism'd) (consideration for conveyance may be proved by parol evidence). Hence,
such evidence is admissible to construe an ambiguous term of an agreement. 679 S.W.2d at
625.
251. 679 S.W.2d at 625-26.
252. Id. at 626.
253. 666 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
254. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
inapplicable to this situation because the ex-husband had relied on the oral
agreement defensively, 255 but the ex-wife's appeal succeeded because the
provisions of section 5.44256 requiring a written partition was not met.
The property agreement need not be reduced to writing under rule 11 if
made in open court and made a part of the record. In Hahne v. Hahne257
the ex-wife brought suit to force her former husband to pay a particular debt
pursuant to an agreed judgment that the husband would pay all community
debts incurred prior to the divorce. The ex-husband argued that the agreed
division of the property was invalid because the trial court reserved its ruling
on a particular debt in question and then failed to rule, and the parties never
signed the judgment. The court rejected both arguments. The agreement
providing that the husband would pay all debts precluded the necessity for
the trial judge to consider the particular, disputed debt, and the agreed divi-
sion did not require the parties' signatures since made in open court.258
Dividing all the Property. In Carter v. Massey259 the court addressed the
issue of whether a life insurance policy was included in the divorce court's
decree, which awarded all personal property in the possession of a party to
that party. The right to the policy was clearly a personal property inter-
est, 26° but the evidence of this group policy was retained by the husband's
employer. The policy was thus not in the ex-husband's physical possession,
but the interest in it was under his control. The court held that the ex-wife's
claim under the policy terminated on divorce and she had no right to any of
the proceeds. 261
255. 666 S.W.2d at 648. Rule 11 requires that the parties must reduce their settlement of a
dispute to writing, but this rule does not apply to a suit concerning an agreement.
256. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.44 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (requiring partition or exchange
agreements to be in writing and signed by the parties). The court remanded the case for a
determination of the rights of the ex-spouses. 666 S.W.2d at 649.
257. 663 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
258. Id. at 79. In fact, the court found the whole appeal frivolous and assessed damages
against the husband for delay. Id. at 79-80. Two other decisions addressed procedural issues
involved in suits concerning property settlement agreements. In Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665
S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984), the supreme court held that when the husband contended that the
agreement had been modified, he was asserting an affirmative defense to the wife's suit on the
prior agreement. Id. at 112. To avoid summary judgment he must come forward with his own
evidence as to the modification. City of Houston v. Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678
(Tex. 1979); Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1978). Because the
husband submitted only an affidavit concerning the modification, the court affirmed the court's
summary judgment holding for the wife. 665 S.W.2d at 112.
In Potts v. Potts, 672 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ), the court
held that parol evidence concerning a written property settlement was admissible if the parol
evidence showed that the written agreement was induced by fraudulent oral promises. Id. at
30. Parol evidence concerning a written agreement is admissible if not submitted to alter the
written agreement. Turner v. Houston Agricultural Credit Corp., 601 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court reversed the case to allow
development of the parol evidence. 672 S.W.2d at 30.
259. 668 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
260. Life insurance policies are specifically included in the statutory definition of property
in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 23(1) (Vernon 1969).
261. 668 S.W.2d at 452. For a discussion of divorced spouses rights to recover under the
former spouse's life insurance policy, see Annot., 31 A.L.R. 59 (1984).
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The San Antonio court of appeals 262 dealt with the question of whether
the ex-husband's endorsement and delivery of bank stock to the ex-wife pur-
suant to the divorce decree constituted an effective transfer although the
bank did not transfer the stock on its books. The ex-wife failed to notify the
bank of the transfer, and the bank, therefore, sent all the dividends and offers
of new stock to the ex-husband. The ex-wife sued the ex-husband for past
dividends. The court held that the transfer was effective as to the former
wife but not as to the bank.263 The husband, therefore, was liable to the ex-
wife for the stock dividends paid subsequent to divorce.264 The ex-wife,
however, was not awarded any right to the stock her former husband had
purchased on the bank options because she had not claimed that right in the
trial court. 265
A Houston court of appeals in Forney v. Forney266 dealt with a wife's ap-
peal of a trial court's denial of her bill of review concerning assets improp-
erly dealt with by the divorce court.267 The wife contended that her
husband's extrinsic fraud prevented her from asserting her right on divorce
to some valuable community mineral interests. The wife argued that the
husband failed to reveal these assets and coerced her to sign a property
agreement that effectively dealt with them. The court, however, held that
the pretrial motions, pleadings, and evidence indicated that the disputed
mineral interests were in issue at the trial, so that any fraud committed was
intrinsic. 268 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the wife's bill of
review. 26
9
262. DeAnda v. DeAnda, 662 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
263. Id. at 109; see also Cooper v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 267 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recording requirement only to protect corporation); Kerr
v. Tyler Guar. State Bank, 283 S.W. 601, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926, no writ) (en-
dorsement and delivery passes legal title to stock, although not recorded on corporate books).
264. 662 S.W.2d at 109.
265. Id.; accord Rogge v. Gulf Oil Corp., 351 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even if the wife had pleaded her right to the stock option at the trial
level, the court could have done no more than given her a right to buy the stock from her ex-
husband, since he alone was offered the right to buy the stock from the corporation. 662
S.W.2d at 109.
266. 672 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
267. A bill of review is a new cause of action concerning an already litigated dispute. To be
successful in the bill of review the complainant must show that she had a meritorious claim in
the prior action, that she was kept from asserting the claim by fraud, and that neither she nor
her attorney on her behalf were at fault in not presenting her claim. Id. at 497; TEx. R. Civ.
P. 329b(f).
268. 672 S.W.2d 498-99. Extrinsic fraud is a wrongful act that prevents the losing party
from knowing his rights or defenses. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 574, 226 S.W.2d
996, 1001 (1950). The extrinsic fraud must be related to some matter not in issue at the trial.
Intrinsic frauds are those that relate to the merits between the parties and must be resolved at
trial. Rylee v. McMorrough, 616 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984, writ dism'd).
269. 672 S.W.2d at 500. The court also denied the ex-wife's claim for partition of the
disputed oil and gas properties under the doctrine of res judicata. The record indicated that
the wife had claimed a right to the properties in the divorce, although the decree did not
mention those properties. Id. at 499. If the record had made no reference to the properties,
the wife could have brought a subsequent suit for partition. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551,
554-55 (Tex. 1970). In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 670 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ
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Property Not Subject to Division. Although the trial court may award a
homestead right to the wife in the husband's separate property for the benefit
of their children, it cannot award the wife's proceeds from a forced sale. The
court cannot divide the separate property of either spouse. 270 The Houston
court of appeals addressed this problem in Gerami v. Gerami.27I The wife
argued that the trial court had not divested the husband of his separate prop-
erty, but ordered a sale and division of the proceeds. The court of appeals
held, however, that the order constituted a divestiture. 272 The case was re-
manded for a new trial to determine an appropriate division of the parties'
properties and to determine whether the homestead should be set aside for
the wife's use during the children's minority.273
The trial court in Smith v. Rabago274 determined that the homestead was
the husband's separate property, but awarded the wife the use of it until the
couple's child became fourteen or the wife should remarry. Prior to the
child's reaching that age the wife filed a motion to reduce arrearages in child
support to judgment and admitted that she had remarried several years
before. The husband then claimed back rent for use of the home since her
remarriage. The trial court found that the amount owed the husband for
imputed rentals for the time the wife was in unauthorized possession of the
homestead was offset by the arrears owed by the husband for child support.
In reversing the conclusion as to set-off, the appellate court pointed out that
it is a prerequisite to set-off of monetary claims that the claims be due be-
tween the parties acting in the same capacity. 275 Under the facts presented
no such mutuality existed. Although debts were owed between the same
parties, the ex-wife was owed child support for the benefit of the child,
whereas the ex-husband was owed rent for the occupancy of his property.
Such debts, the court held, cannot be offset against each other.276 The court
also reiterated the principle that courts may award the use and occupancy of
the husband's separate property homestead to the wife during the minority
of a child of which she has custody. 277 Although the wife had complained
that the decree awarding her the use of the homestead until she remarried
constituted a restraint on marriage, the court held that Texas law sanctions
such restraint. 278 The operation of the principal rule provides a stable envi-
ronment for the rearing of children until the custodian's remarriage. Prop-
erly analyzed, the award of the use of the homestead is not a concession to
ref'd, n.r.e.), the ex-wife pursued such a remedy with respect to a fraudulent transfer of com-
munity property during marriage.
270. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977).
271. 666 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
272. Id. at 242.
273. Id.
274. 672 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
275. Id. at 40.
276. Id. Child support, however, is an amount owed the mother and not the child. A set-
off in this sort of situation would seem reasonable.
277. Id.; accord Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. 1977); see also
Bush v. Bush, 237 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ) (court awarded wife
use of the homestead until she remarried, although it was the husband's separate property).
278. 672 S.W.2d at 40.
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the wife, but an element of child support that might be reevaluated on the
event of remarriage.
York v. York 279 involved an undivided partnership interest of the ex-hus-
band, the extent of the interest, and the divisibility of its future profits.
Shortly before the divorce a partnership in which the husband had an inter-
est acquired an oil and gas lease. Four years after the divorce the wife
learned of the husband's dealings and sued to claim half of the community
interest in all partnership activities before and after divorce. The jury found
that the partnership had acquired an interest in only one lease prior to the
divorce and that the husband had become a member of the partnership prior
to the divorce. The trial judge awarded the wife a money judgment for half
the value of the husband's share in the lease acquired before divorce. 280 The
El Paso court of appeals, however, awarded the wife half the value of the
husband's interest in all leases the partnership acquired during its existence
because the trial court concluded that the husband acquired a general part-
nership interest before divorce. 281 The partnership interest, thus, was
deemed community property and its profits generated after the divorce were
also attributed to the community. 282 The El Paso court ignored the possibil-
ity that the husband's partnership interest at the time of divorce may have
been merely a joint venture interest limited to the one lease. No formal part-
nership agreement had been drawn up at that time, nor did the wife submit a
jury charge concerning the extent of the partnership that existed at the time
of divorce. 283 In Berry v. Berry284 the Texas Supreme Court held that in a
partition suit affecting retirement benefits, the value of the benefits should be
determined at the date of divorce, but no more.285 The court of appeals did
not address this issue. 286
279. 678 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e., 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 316
(Mar. 27, 1985).
280. Id. at 110.
281. Id. at 112-13.
282. Texas Uniform Partnership Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 28-A(2)
(Vernon 1970) (allowing partnership interests to be community property); McKean v. Thomp-
son, 555 S.W.2d 136, 136-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (husband not awarded
judgment for contribution against former wife who had received a half interest in the venture);
Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ)
(divorce proceeding necessitated finding on question of joint venture or partnership).
283. The jury found that the husband had an interest in a partnership at the time of di-
vorce, and that this partnership had acquired only one lease at that time. The trial judge could
have concluded that the partnership interest existing at the time of divorce was limited to the
acquisition of one lease. Because no issue concerning the extent of the partnership was submit-
ted, the trial court's judgment should have been dispositive on that point. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
284. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
285. Id. at 947.
286. For an interesting decision concerning the tax liability of partnership income during
the year of divorce, see Adams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 563 (1984). In Adams the Tax Court
addressed the question of what proportion of distributed partnership income should be
charged to the community when the couple divorces during the year. On the basis of an
interim closing of the partnership books, the ex-husband reported all distributable income ac-
cruing before the divorce as community. The ex-wife used the partnership year-end tax return
to determine that the community income was proportionate to the number of months the
couple was married during the year. Not surprisingly the two numbers differed, and the com-
missioner assessed a deficiency against the ex-husband. The Tax Court held the ex-husband's
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The court in Morgan v. Horton287 confronted the issue of the divisibility of
an ex-husband's teacher-retirement benefits in a partition suit. The divorce
court had failed to divide these benefits and the prospective pensioner as-
serted that they were indivisible as a matter of law.288 The court, however,
found that statute only protected the retirement fund from creditors' claims,
and the ex-wife was not a creditor.289
In a procedural ruling concerning property not subject to division, the
court held in Stinson v. Stinson290 that if the divorce court awards one
spouse's separate property to the other spouse, the complaining spouse must
appeal and cannot attack the judgment collaterally. 29I The ex-husband had
argued that the divorce decree was void because it divided his separate prop-
erty.2 9 2 The court held the award of separate property was an error of sub-
stantive law subject to attack by appeal only. 2 9 3
Exercise of Discretion. A Texas trial court has broad discretion in making a
just division of community property on divorce and may consider, inter alia,
disparity of the spouses' earning power, probable needs for future support,
and the comparative size of the separate estates. 294 Furthermore, a fraud on
the community estate by one of the spouses may justify an unequal division
of the community property. 29 5 If the amount in issue is of trivial value, the
fact that an asset was mischaracterized as separate property does not of itself
amount to an inequitable property division. 296 The complaining party must
show the manifest unfairness of the division as made by the court 297 or must
demonstrate that the court would probably have made a different division of
the property had it been properly characterized. 298 Texas courts of appeals
historically have tended to reject appeals on grounds of abuse of discretion.
This position illustrates the broad power that courts of appeals give to trial
courts in dividing community property. 299
method improper because the interim closing of the partnership books did not accurately re-
flect the correct taxable income. Id. at 569. The decision, however, should not be read as
providing an inflexible rule in determining the community share of partnership income. If the
husband had conducted an audited, accurate assessment of the partnership income at the time
of divorce, the court would probably have found his method to be sufficient. For a discussion
concerning the tax consequence of divorce in general, see Jones, Snider & Vevleman, Tax
Consideration Upon Divorce: The Texas Case, 46 TEX. B.J. 1118 (1983).
287. 675 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
288. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. I lOB, § 31.005 (Vernon Pam. 1985) provides that
"[a]ll retirement allowances ... are exempt from garnishment, attachment .... and any
other process. .. "
289. 675 S.W.2d at 604.
290. 668 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
291. Id. at 841.
292. If the decision was void, it was subject to collateral attack. Templeton v. Ferguson, 89
Tex. 47, 55, 33 S.W.2d 329, 332-33 (1895); Williams v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. 668 S.W.2d at 841.
294. Padon v. Padon, 670 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
295. Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 245-47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
296. See McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 161-62.
297. King v. King, 661 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
298. Reid v. Reid, 658 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
299. Klise v. Klise, 678 S.W.2d 545, 547-48 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1984, no
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When a court makes an erroneous computation of one party's earnings,
the court of appeals may find that the trial court abused its discretion in
making the division. In Simpson v. Simpson 30 the court of appeals held that
discounting the valuation of a pension by subtracting a hypothetical tax lia-
bility was erroneous. 30i The court also found that the trial court erred in
not considering substantial earnings that the husband had spent for another
woman. 30 2 The court held that account should be taken of the wife's interest
in the funds spen t for that purpose. 30 3 The court consequently found these
errors resulted in an improper division and remanded the cause.
3 °4
Errors in characterization and valuation of marital property may also
cause an abuse of discretion upon division at divorce. Because the trial court
erred in Cook v. Cook 30 5 in valuing various community assets and mis-
characterizing certain pieces of property as entirely community instead of
partly separate,30 6 the court's award amounted to only thirty-eight percent
of the community to the wife rather than the sixty percent the court thought
it had awarded. The court of appeals found nothing in the record to support
this division and held that the trial court had abused its discretion.30 7 The
court based its decision on the disparity between what the trial court be-
lieved to be the proportion of the division and the actual division, rather
writ) (although the court cannot order permanent alimony, the court does not abuse its discre-
tion if it approves a separate contractual agreement binding one spouse to pay alimony); Bea-
vers v. Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296, 298-300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (no abuse of
discretion in concluding that community claim for reimbursement from wife's separate prop-
erty equalled community claim for reimbursement from husband's separate property); Hanson
v. Hanson, 672 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd) (dispar-
ity of earning capacities does not mandate a larger portion of the estate for the party with the
lower earning capacity); Gendebien v. Gendebien, 668 S.W.2d 905, 908-09 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (court will not find that the trial court abused its discretion in
absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law); Ruiz v. Ruiz, 668 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (no abuse of discretion in awarding half the community
property to the wife and ordering that the husband pay child support although earning capaci-
ties were equal); Pierce v. Pierce, 667 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ
dism'd) (evidence at the trial was sufficient to support the award to the wife); Zuniga v.
Zuniga, 664 S.W.2d 810, 814-15 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (unequal division
of property in the husband's favor was justified by the wife's greater earning power); Roberts v.
Roberts, 663 S.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ) (wife's poor health and finan-
cial difficulties justified large award of community property to her).
300. 679 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
301. Id. at 42; accord Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
(14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
302. 679 S.W.2d at 42.
303. Id.; see Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ).
304. 679 S.W.2d at 42. On remand the court also instructed the trial court to consider the
attorney's fees of both parties in making a division. Id.; accord Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d
222, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).
305. 679 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
306. Portions of some community property, namely the couple's residence and automobile,
were purchased with the wife's separate funds. A tenancy in common between the separate
and community estates thus existed as to that property. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610-
11, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (1937).
307. 679 S.W.2d at 585-86.
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than the disproportionality of the actual division. 30 8
Military Retirement Benefits. In McCarty v. McCarty,30 9 decided June 26,
1981, the United States Supreme Court ruled that nondisability military re-
tirement benefits were not divisible as community property by state
courts, 310 thus reversing Texas law as it then stood. Because McCarty was
not given retroactive effect, a bifurcated treatment of military retirement
benefits resulted and turned on the date of the final divorce decree .3 1  The
situation was further complicated when, effective February 1, 1983, Con-
gress reversed the effect of McCarty by passage of the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 3 12 which permits the division of
such benefits as community property for periods beginning after June 25,
1981. This ebb and flow of applicable law has generated a great deal of
litigation regarding proper treatment of military retirement benefits under
differing fact patterns turning on the operative dates.
In Tyson v. Alexander31 3 the court held that the ex-husband could not
assert that a 1979 judgment awarding the wife one-half of his past and future
retirement benefits was voided by McCarty.314 In the pre-McCarty action
the ex-wife had been awarded a judgment against the ex-husband for one-
half of all retirement benefits the husband would receive. Later, the ex-
husband entered into a compromise agreement with his former wife regard-
ing the judgment. The agreement provided that the husband would pay
$10,000 in cash and one-half of all future benefits. After McCarty the ex-
husband refused to make further payments, and the ex-wife brought suit for
the unpaid benefits. The court found that McCarty should not be applied
retroactively to nullify the judgment, and the ex-husband could not claim
that he had entered into a compromise agreement under a mutual mistake of
fact.315 At the time the husband entered into the agreement the divorce
court had judicial power to order him to pay one-half of his benefits to his
wife, and thus the agreement based on that order would stand.316
In another case317 the trial judge orally granted a divorce to the parties in
June 1982. The next day the judge ordered a division of the property, treat-
308. Id. at 585. The court stated that "the trial court's errors led to the rendition of a
decree bringing about a result the opposite of that which the trial court intended .... Id.
309. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
310. Id. at 233.
311. Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. 1983); see Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). Under the Act a court may divide retire-
ment benefits according to state law. Id. § 1408(c)(1).
312. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
313. 672 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
314. Id. at 626.
315. Id.
316. Id. The husband's error was one of law and was, therefore, not a basis for avoiding the
contract. Pollard v. Steffens, 161 Tex. 595, 599-600, 343 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (1961) (absent
fraud or misconduct, equity will not void contract for mistake of law); Hall v. Hayes, 441
S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, no writ) (every adult competent person pre-
sumed to know the law); Ussery v. Hollebeke, 391 S.W.2d 457, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (parties understood the facts but not the law).
317. Miller v. Miller, 671 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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ing the husband's military retirement benefits as separate property pursuant
to the McCarty decision. In August 1983, over a year after the oral rendi-
tion of judgment, the judge signed a decree containing the same terms of
property division. The wife filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was
denied. The appellate court reversed, holding as error the trial court's re-
fusal to reconsider its ruling in light of the passage of the congressional act in
combination with the court's plenary power to vacate or to modify its judg-
ment within thirty days after the judgment was signed. 318
In Voronin v. Voronin3 19 the decree awarding all military retirement bene-
fits to the husband was signed on January 31, 1983, the day before the effec-
tive date of the USFSPA. The wife filed a timely motion for a new trial, but
was denied relief. Again on the basis of the trial court's plenary power to
reconsider its decision, the Austin appeals court reversed and remanded. 320
These two cases illustrate the proposition that the trial court should follow
changes in the law as long as that court continues to have jurisdiction. 321
Several other cases dealt with other provisions of the USFSPA. In Neese
v. Neese322 the husband stopped making payments when the Supreme Court
handed down McCarty, but resumed them after the enactment of the USF-
SPA. The ex-wife then sued for the missed payments and increases in retire-
ment pay that should have accompanied her fraction of benefits awarded by
the divorce court. The ex-husband argued that section 1408(c)(1) of the
USFSPA mandated that the retirement benefits be divided in accordance
with Texas law and that Texas law treated increases in retirement pay occur-
ring after divorce as the husband's separate property under Berry v. Berry.3 23
The appellate court held that Berry did not govern this case. 324 Berry was a
post-divorce suit for partition of undivided retirement benefits under a pri-
vate pension scheme. The ex-husband had obtained increases in retirement
pay through continued employment and union negotiations after divorce.
The Texas Supreme Court held in Berry that the benefits should be valued at
318. Id. at 137; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. In Harrell v. Harrell, 684 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ filed), the court allowed an ex-wife to proceed by way of bill
of review to reopen a McCarty era decree denying her a share of her husband's military bene-
fits. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw.
L.J. 65, 103-04 n.319 (1983); Note, Closing the McCarty-USFSPA Window: A Proposal for
Relief from McCarty Era Final Judgments, 63 TEX. L. REv. 497 (1984); see also Trahan v.
Trahan, 682 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (partition suit brought during
the McCarty era for prior undivided military retirement benefit).
319. 662 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd).
320. Id. at 105; see McKnight, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 76, at 164-65.
321. This does not mean that on the court of appeals' remand pursuant to the enactment of
the USFSPA the appellant can raise new issues concerning post-divorce acquisitions. Gordon
v. Blackmon, 675 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ), illustrates this prop-
osition. On remand the appellant-wife had attempted to obtain business records relating to
income of her ex-husband earned after the trial court's initial divorce decree. The trial court
quashed the notice to take her ex-husband's deposition and she petitioned for a writ of manda-
mus. The court held that its earlier remand for consideration of the award of property under
the USFSPA did not extend the marriage and so the wife could not request additional discov-
ery on remand as to post-divorce acquisitions. Id. at 793-94.
322. 669 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
323. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1980).
324. 669 S.W.2d at 390.
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the date of divorce, lest the husband's separate property be divested.325 The
husband in Neese had retired prior to divorce and his retirement benefits
had, therefore, already matured. The court held that awarding the wife a
right in the increase did not invade his separate property because the hus-
band's right to his retirement benefits accrued before divorce.326 Although
the language of Berry suggests that courts should look at the value of the
right to retirement benefits at the time of divorce, the court should also de-
termine how the pensioner obtained the right to the post-divorce increase in
benefits. Even if the pensioner does not achieve the right of increase through
his post-divorce labor, might such increases nevertheless be gratuities to the
pensioner?
In Oxelgren v. Oxelgren327 the Forth Worth court of appeals held that the
USFSPA does not require that the couple be married at least ten years dur-
ing which one spouse performed military service toward retirement in order
to make the statute applicable to the division of military retirement bene-
fits. 3 28 The husband had been married nine years and so claimed his retire-
ment benefits were not subject to division. The ten-year-marriage provision
of USFSPA refers to the direct payments by the federal government to the
former spouse of a retired service-member. 329 If the service-member was
married less than ten years, the benefits would be paid directly to the pen-
sioner, who may be responsible to transfer a portion to an ex-spouse. 330
Under the USFSPA a court may not divide retirement pay unless the
court has jurisdiction by reason of (1) the pensioner's residence other than
because of military assignment in the territorial jurisdiction of the court;
(2) his domicile within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; or (3) his
consent to the jurisdiction. 33 1 In Phillips v. Phillips,332 a case involving a
jurisdictional controversy, the divorce decree awarding all military retire-
ment pay to the husband was signed in December 1982. The trial court
granted the wife's motion for new trial on January 19, 1983. The husband's
motion for a nonsuit was granted, and the husband filed a motion attacking
the court's jurisdiction with respect to the wife's previously filed cross-action
for divorce. The grounds for the plea to the jurisdiction were that the hus-
325. 647 S.W.2d at 947.
326. 669 S.W.2d at 390.
327. 670 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
328. Id. at 412.
329. Id. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) (1982) provides:
If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this
section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during
which the member performed at least 10 years of service. . . payments may not
be made under this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting
from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable retired or
retainer pay of the member as property of the member or property of the mem-
ber and his spouse.
330. 670 S.W.2d at 412. The legislative history of the Act fully supports this interpreta-
tion. HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 749, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 167, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1569, 1571; S. REP. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1596, 1599.
331. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1982).
332. 672 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ).
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band no longer resided in Texas and that he did not consent to the court's
jurisdiction. A second divorce decree, entered in March 1983, awarded the
wife one-half of the husband's accrued military retirement pay. The judg-
ment of the trial court was affirmed. 333 The husband had, indeed, consented
to the court's jurisdiction by filing the original suit.334 The husband's later
motion for nonsuit did not extinguish the trial court's jurisdiction over the
wife's suit because a nonsuit cannot affect the right of an adverse party to be
heard on that party's claim for affirmative relief.335
Southern v. Glenn 3 3 6 interpreted the USFSPA jurisdictional requirements
to divide military retirement benefits in the context of a post-divorce parti-
tion suit. The court held that the evidence did not show that the service
member had either his residence or his domicile within the jurisdiction of the
trial court. 337 The ex-wife argued, however, that the USFSPA did not apply
to partition suits, but the court rejected the argument. 338 The court held
that a partition suit is one that treats the disposable retired pay of the mili-
tary member as dealt with by the Act and thus applies to partition suits.3 39
The USFSPA is, therefore, applicable to post-divorce partitions of property
that should have been divided on divorce as well as to military pensions
actually divided on divorce.
Attorney's Fees. The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus 34°
to require a trial judge to vacate his order awarding the wife interim attor-
ney's fees pursuant to section 3.58(c)(4) of the Family Code34 1 after the hus-
band filed a motion for a new trial. 34 2 Section 3.58(c)(4) provides:
[T]he court, on the motion of any party or on the court's own motion,
may grant a temporary injunction after notice and hearing for the pres-
ervation of the property and protection of the parties as deemed neces-
sary and equitable, including but not limited to an order directed to one
or both parties:
333. Id. at 612.
334. Id.
335. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 164).
336. 677 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a recent deci-
sion concerning the effect, with regard to property division, of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdic-
tion over the husband, see Kramer v. Kramer, 668 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1984, no
writ).
337. 677 S.W.2d at 583. The service member's residence in Mississippi was undisputed.
The court then defined domicile as the place where he has his fixed or permanent home and to
which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent from home. Id (citing C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 26 (1976)). Since the husband stated he had always
intended to return to Mississippi, the court found that Mississippi continued to be his domicile.
677 S.W.2d at 583-84.
338. 677 S.W.2d at 583.
339. Id. at 582. The jurisdictional requirement applies to suits that treat "the disposable
retired or retainer pay. . . in the manner described in paragraph (1)." Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(c)(4) (1982)).
340. Walker v. Towslee, 677 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1984).
341. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
342. The court's order stated that the payment of attorney's fees was made under TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(b)(4), which does not exist, so the supreme court held that the case
could have only been related to § 3.58(c)(4). 677 S.W.2d at 503.
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(4) ordering payment of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses;
343
Because the order for attorney's fees was not in conjunction with a tempo-
rary injunction, the court ruled that the order for attorney's fees was
improper. 344
In another instance 345 the wife's attorney sued the husband for attorney's
fees pursuant to an award in a suit for divorce. The trial court granted the
attorney relief, and the court of appeals affirmed.346 The supreme court re-
fused the husband's writ of error and further assessed damages against the
husband for taking a frivolous appeal. 347
Enforcement. In 1981 an ex-wife brought an action for contempt against her
former husband for refusing to pay her a portion of his retirement benefits in
accordance with the divorce decree. 348 The court, however, discharged the
husband, holding that the divorce decree was vague and ambiguous. 349 Sub-
sequently the ex-wife instituted a suit for declaratory judgment and bill of
review. The trial court modified the divorce decree, ordering that the hus-
band pay to the district clerk each monthly retirement check. The court of
appeals held that this amounted to a modification of the divorce decree,
which the trial court had no jurisdiction to make.350 The court of appeals
accordingly simply clarified the decree that the same court had held ambigu-
ous in the contempt proceeding. 351
The Dallas court of appeals was faced with the construction and enforce-
ment of a similar divorce decree in Harris v. Harris.35 2 The divorce decree
343. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
344. 677 S.W.2d at 503. The court has power to grant the writ under TEX. R. Civ. P. 483.
In Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 679 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ), the court
allowed an award of attorney's fees in a suit to enforce a decree for alimony and support
because the parties, having been divorced in Tennessee, stipulated that Tennessee law would
govern the enforcement action. In Beavers v. Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, no writ), however, the court of appeals overruled the trial court's award of attor-
ney's fees for any additional proceedings that may have been necessary to enforce the divorce
court's judgment.
345. Hennigan v. Hennigan, 677 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. 1984).
346. Hennigan v. Hennigan, 666 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984); see
Wileman v. Wade, 665 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ), discussed supra notes
135-43 and accompanying text.
347. 677 S.W.2d at 496. An appellate court may assess damages for taking a frivolous
appeal under TEX. R. Civ. P. 438, 491, and 469. In Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 662 S.W.2d 655
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ), the trial court awarded 10% of the community property as
damages for the husband's frivolous appeal pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P. 483 (damages for
frivolous appeal shall constitute up to 10% of the amount in dispute). The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the husband had not appealed on the ground that all community prop-
erty should be awarded to him, so that was not the amount in controversy. 662 S.W.2d at 658.
348. Ex parte Smiley, 626 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
349. Id. at 819.
350. Smiley v. Smiley, 679 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ). The
only authority that allows a trial court to modify a previously entered divorce decree is TEX.
R. Civ. P. 329b, which permits modification of child support and custody divisions of the
decree. The court held that this provision was inapplicable. 679 S.W.2d at 172-73.
351. 679 S.W.2d at 173.
352. 679 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ dism'd).
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granted occupancy of the family home to the wife until a child became eight-
een. At that time the wife had a reasonable time to exercise an option to
purchase the home. If she failed to exercise the option, the husband could
purchase the home. When the husband tried to exercise his option, the wife
refused to sell and the husband sued for enforcement. The trial court, how-
ever, held that the provision of the decree was ambiguous and unenforceable.
The court, therefore, ordered the property sold and directed that the pro-
ceeds be disbursed equally to the parties. The court of appeals found that
the court's holding was a modification of the decree, which the court had no
jurisdiction to enter, because the modified order eliminated the options en-
tirely. 353 The court remanded the case for a jury trial to determine the issues
relative to the parties' property rights. 354 Both of these cases illustrate the
care a trial court must exercise in clarifying divorce decrees in order not to
change the substance of the decree.
In McDannell v. United States Office of Personnel Management355 the wife
attempted to force the federal government to pay her share of her husband's
civil service retirement benefits directly to her when the husband became
delinquent in his payments. Congressional legislation had allowed payment
to a former spouse, if expressly provided for in a divorce decree, on terms
similar to those of the USFSPA. 356 The question concerned whether the
statute, like the USFSPA, authorized direct payment to the former spouse of
the federal employee. After examining the legislative history of the Act, the
court concluded that the legislation authorized the federal agency to comply
with terms of the state court decree, but not to undertake its own determina-
tion of spousal entitlement. 357
Similarly, in Squires v. Squires358 the ex-husband had become delinquent
in his payment to his former wife of one-half his retirement payments as
ordered by the divorce court. The husband pleaded the statute of limitations
in response to the wife's suit.359 The court held that the suit was not an
action for debt, which might be barred by the two- or four-year statutes of
limitations, but rather, a suit to revive a judgment, and ordered a division of
353. Id. at 77. Indeed, the court of appeals found that the provision was not at all ambigu-
ous, but raised a fact issue as to whether the wife could still exercise her option. Id.
354. Id. The trial court had denied the husband a jury trial. The court of appeals held that
the action was one the common law recognized and, therefore, that the husband had a consti-
tutional right to a jury trial. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15; see Welch v. Welch, 369 S.W.2d
434, 436-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ). In Cohen v. Cohen, 663 S.W.2d 617
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the appellate court held that the trial
court had jurisdiction to interpret ambiguous provisions of a property settlement contained in
a divorce decree rendered over seven years earlier. The doctrine of res judicata posed no bar to
the motion in aid of judgment because none of the elements prerequisite to the application of
the doctrine had been satisfied. Id. at 620.
355. 716 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1983).
356. 5 U.S.C. § 83450) (1982).
357. 716 F.2d at 1065-66. The terms of the decree had ordered the husband, not the fed-
eral agency, to pay the wife.
358. 673 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
359. The appeal also dealt with the husband's motion for a jury trial and his request to




property.36° The latter suit falls under a ten-year bar, which the wife was
well within. 361 This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the Texas
Supreme Court's curious interpretation of the article 5529362 in Huff v.
Huff3 6 3 in relation to arrears in child-support payments. The entire subject
is in need of legislative attention.
Other Post-Divorce Relief. A frequent source of dispute is an ex-spouse's
neglect to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy subsequent to
divorce. In Beckham v. Beckham 364 both the former wife and the deceased
husband's administratrix claimed life insurance proceeds when the husband
died thirty days subsequent to divorce without modifying the beneficiary
designation in favor of the ex-wife. The trial court found that the decedent
did not intend that his former wife be the beneficiary under the policy and
granted judgment for the administratrix. 365 On appeal the ex-wife con-
tended that she retained an insurable interest under the policy even though
the parties were divorced, and the intent of the decedent was irrelevant.
Holding that his intent was relevant when the husband was awarded the
policies and died shortly after the divorce decree, the Houston court of ap-
peals rejected her contention. 366 Under the circumstances a rebuttable pre-
sumption arose that the ex-husband intended his ex-wife to remain as
beneficiary. 367 The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the trial court's holding that the decedent had not intended his ex-wife
to continue as beneficiary. 368
Nunc pro tunc judgments369 also gave rise to post-divorce disputes. In
Hutcherson v. Lawrence370 the trial court had awarded the wife attorney's
fees in granting the divorce, but the award was not spelled out in the written
judgment. The court entered a judgment nunc pro tunc to rectify the error,
and the ex-husband sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to va-
cate the order. The ex-husband argued that the failure to include attorney's
fees was a judicial error. The court of appeals held it was merely a clerical
360. Id. at 684-85.
361. Id. at 685. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 5532 (Vernon 1958) provides: "A judgment
in any court of record, where execution has not issued within twelve months after the rendition
of the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or an action of debt brought thereon within ten
years of such judgment, and not after."
362. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
363. 648 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. 1983).
364. 672 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
365. The former wife had used some of the proceeds to purchase a car. The trial court,
however, made no adjudication in relation to the car, because the administratrix had not
pleaded for possession of the car.
366. 672 S.W.2d at 42-43.
367. Id.; see McDonald v. McDonald, 632 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (animosity of decedent in divorce proceeding evidenced intent that ex-wife not
receive insurance proceeds though she was named beneficiary); Pitts v. Ashcraft, 586 S.W.2d
685, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (former wife received pro-
ceeds as named beneficiary over widow's objection).
368. 672 S.W.2d at 43.
369. A judgment nunc pro tunc may be entered to correct a clerical error beyond the pe-
riod allowed for making a substantive change in the order. TEX. R. Civ. P. 301.
370. 673 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
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error, but issued the writ because the judgment nunc pro tunc did not desig-
nate what was being correcting. 371 The trial judge was, therefore, required
to enter a new and acceptable judgment nunc pro tunc. 372
In Garza v. Garza373 the trial court entered a divorce decree awarding a
particular piece of real property to the wife, subject to a ninety-day option of
the husband to buy the property at an agreed price. The ex-husband at-
tempted to exercise the option, but his former wife refused to convey the
property, thereby forcing the ex-husband to file a motion to enforce the judg-
ment. The ex-wife chose that opportunity to attack the validity of the judg-
ment. The San Antonio appeals court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
grant her request for relief, holding that a property division contained in a
final decree is not subject to collateral attack when the decree was entered
pursuant to the parties' attorneys' agreement as to form.
374
371. Id. at 948-49.
372. Id. at 949. Lewis v. Lewis, 677 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ), dealt
with proper service of citation in a post-divorce dispute. The wife had obtained a default
judgment against the husband in a suit for judgment nunc pro tune alleging that two mineral
interests were left undivided by the divorce court. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded for a new trial because the citation had been served over 90 days after its issuance and
was thus not in compliance with rule 101. Id at 911. Courts will not uphold default judg-
ments unless the opposing party has strictly complied with the rules of civil procedure. Mc-
Kanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d .927, 928-30 (Tex. 1965) (plaintiff had burden to prove proper
service); Mega v. Anglo Iron & Metal Co., 601 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (movant must have complied strictly with procedural rules for issuance,
service, and return of citation).
373. 666 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
374. Id. at 208.
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